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ABSTRACT 
In 2005, Florida became the first state to pass the heavily National Rifle Association , 
NRA,  supported “Stand Your Ground” law. The most notable components of the law were 
abolishing the duty to retreat for someone who is not engaged in lawful activity and is in a place 
where he has the right to be, granting civil and criminal immunity to those using lawful force, 
and presuming that a person who is attacked  in his dwelling, residence, and occupied vehicle has 
a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. The law was subject to a substantial amount of 
criticism because it was a significant departure from Florida’s more than a century old common 
law principles regarding self-defense. Possibly due to Florida not having any precedents for these 
cases, Florida courts would have conflicting decisions in these matters and law enforcement 
agencies would enforce the law differently in similar incidents. Regardless of the issues faced by 
Florida, over twenty states would adopt their own versions. A significant number of these states 
are in the Southeastern region of the United States and are neighbors to Florida or border 
Florida’s neighbors, such as Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Louisiana. Because of this interesting pattern, the study examines the idea of 
southern culture playing a role in the passage of “Stand Your Ground” via the  “Culture of 
Honor” theory and the researcher decided to use these jurisdictions and Florida as this study’s 
sample.  The researcher also wanted to include these jurisdictions because the existing “Stand 
Your Ground” literature mainly focuses on Florida and the researcher wanted to add something 
new to the discussion. 
The intent of this study to examine Florida’s influence on the other jurisdictions, note any 
commonalties between the statutes of the jurisdictions, compare justifiable homicide statistics for 
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the jurisdictions that provided such data, predict the future of these laws, and explore the 
“Culture of Honor” Theory as a possible explanation for “Stand Your Ground” laws in the states 
discussed.  The study accomplished these goals by examining how each jurisdiction handled self-
defense before “Stand Your Ground,” looking at the motives behind the jurisdictions adopting 
“Stand Your Ground,” comparing justifiable homicides in the four jurisdictions that provided 
them in the years immediate preceding the passage of “Stand Your Ground” to the subsequent 
years, and looking at amendments and proposals that were presented after the passage of “Stand 
Your Ground.”  The results uncovered that all the jurisdictions, except for Georgia and 
Tennessee, show a very strong Florida influence based on their similarities to Florida’s law and 
legislators in the jurisdictions clearly mentioning Florida as their inspiration for proposing their 
own versions. In the jurisdictions that provided justifiable homicides, all showed an increase in 
the number of justifiable homicides after the passage of “Stand Your Ground.”  The jurisdictions 
in this study have also shown a strong resistance to any amendments or the complete repeal of 
this law. Therefore, any drastic amendment or the complete repeal seems unlikely in the future. 
The  “Culture of Honor”  Theory does explain why a few of the jurisdictions in the study adopted 
“Stand Your Ground” but Florida and the NRA’s influence explain why others chose this course 
of action. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In order to understand the self-defense laws of today and note how they have evolved 
over time, it is necessary to examine their English common law roots. By the thirteenth century 
England had established guidelines for how self-defense would operate (Levin 528). A homicide 
was only justified under three circumstances: “when it occurred in the lawful prosecution of the 
King's writ, in the attempt to apprehend a fleeing felon, or in the attempt to protect oneself from 
robbery” (Mischke 1002). A killing of a person  that did not meet any of these criteria was 
considered to be homicide, even if it was in self-defense (Mischke 1003). All hope was not lost 
for someone who acted in self-defense.  If the accused was able  to show that he “retreated to the 
wall” before killing the deceased and the necessity of the killing in court, the jury could enter a 
special verdict of guilty. This verdict was important because it allowed an application for  the 
King to intervene and possibly pardon the defendant from any punishment (Brown 3).  This 
pardon gave the King the final say in self-defense cases and created a monopoly for the state 
(Levin 528). This monopoly communicated to the citizens that the right to defend one’s self 
against an attack was not an automatic license to kill.  
 The elements of necessity and retreat were the cornerstones of self-defense and were 
related. To prove necessity, defendants would have to establish that it was necessary for them to 
kill to avoid their own deaths or severe injury (Brown 4).  This principle of necessity was a 
catalyst for the development of the duty to retreat. The duty to retreat required that when 
attacked  the defendant had to first make an attempt to leave the scene or retreat as far away from 
the aggressor as possible; until his back was to the wall if necessary. The defendant was 
prohibited from standing his ground and initially attacking the aggressor. Only when all modes 
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of retreat were eliminated could the defendant physically attack his assailant and kill if necessary 
(Brown 4). The rationale was that if a person could retreat safely from an attack,  then killing the 
attacker was not necessary. Thus, the necessity element was not satisfied.  
 There was one place where the duty to retreat was inapplicable: the home. The English 
believed that a man’s home was his castle and he should not have to retreat when faced with an 
attack that took place in it (Levin 530). This rationale would become known as the defense of 
habitation and today is called the castle doctrine. It is important to note that the defense of 
habitation and self-defense were treated as separate issues in England (Catafalmo 506).  While 
self-defense pertained to protection from a physical attack, the defense of habitation related to  
defending the home against intrusion (Catafalmo 507). The home occupied a special status in 
English society. Legal scholar Sir William Blackstone offered his insight, “the home was valued 
highly enough in the cultural consciousness not only to be likened to a castle, a place where 
safety from enemies should be guaranteed, but also to confer a certain degree of immunity from 
the state” (Levin 530).  In his “castle,” a man was entitled to use physical force, including deadly 
force,  as a first option and not a last resort to protect his home. It was not taken into 
consideration if the intruder only committed a misdemeanor or that none of  the home’s residents 
were harmed (Catafalmo 507). While the King had a monopoly in the public sphere, it was the 
man who had the monopoly in his home (Levin 531).  
 When the European colonists came to America, they brought more than their just 
families, clothes, and cultures, they also brought the principles established in English common 
law. While the majority of states  had no issue with the defense of habitation,  there was division 
about the duty to retreat. In the 1800s, many courts in the South and West  refused to impose this 
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duty against defendants (Catafalmo  507). In the South, they felt that it was cowardly to retreat 
from an attack and violated their code of honor (Mischke 1006).Using self-defense as 
justification or excuse for homicide was accepted by the majority of the  South, resulting in 
acquittals for homicides that would  likely have been considered cold-blooded murder in the 
North (Catafalmo 506).The duty to retreat  had retreated into the minority (Brown 5).  
This division among the states would eventually cause the United States Supreme Court 
to weigh in ,but unfortunately  it failed to provide any meaningful clarity on the issue (Mischke 
1007). In Beard v. The United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895), the Supreme Court reversed  a circuit 
court’s manslaughter conviction. In this case, Beard and the deceased were involved in an on-
going feud over a cow. Beard saw the deceased arguing with his wife. The deceased angrily 
approached him and reached into his pocket. Beard struck him in the head and killed him before 
he would retrieve what later was revealed to be a weapon. In its opinion the Court said: “The 
defendant was where he had the right to be, when the deceased advanced upon him in a 
threatening manner, and with a deadly weapon; . . . he was not obliged to retreat, nor to consider 
whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any attack made 
upon him with a deadly weapon” (158 U.S. at 564). This decision seemed to indicate that 
Supreme Court had indeed sided with those jurisdictions who would not enforce a duty to retreat. 
However, one year later, in Allen v.  United States, 164 U.S. 429 (1896), the Court appeared 
somewhat inexplicably (in light of Beard), to be on the side of jurisdictions that enforced the 
duty to retreat by saying,  
If [ a person] is attacked by another in such a way as to denote a purpose to take 
away his life, or to do him some great bodily harm from which death or 
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permanent injury may follow, in such a case he may lawfully kill the assailant. 
When? Provided he use all the means in his power otherwise to save his own life 
or prevent the intended harm, such as retreating as far as he can, or disabling him 
without killing him, if it be in his power. (164 U.S  at 497) 
 The Court went on to say, “It must be an act where he cannot avoid the consequences. If he can, 
he must avoid them, if he can reasonably do so with due regard to his own safety" (164 U.S  at 
498).  
The next time the Court would weigh in was Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 
(1921).  Whether then decisively ruling if there was a duty to retreat or not, the Court stated, 
“Rationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to 
determine whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical 
proof of guilt” (256 U.S. at 343). In other words, the totality of the circumstances would have to 
be taken into consideration when deciding a claim of self-defense and a verdict would not only 
hinge if the defendant retreated or not.  
The Court’s collective jurisprudence from 1895-1921 indicate that the Court was not 
exactly sure on where it stood on the issue of the duty to retreat. It did not offer clear guidelines 
for the states to follow. The states were left to decide on how they would handle the issue for 
themselves. The states took various approaches. Parts of this thesis will illustrate the approaches 
that were taken by the jurisdictions in this study. 
The debate on duty to retreat versus no duty to retreat lost its intensity for a period of 
time. Then in April 2005, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed the heavily National Rifle 
Association (NRA) supported Senate Bill 436 into law (Wallace 37; Megale 114).  With this 
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action, Florida became the first state to enact what would become known as the “Stand Your 
Ground”  law . The law accomplished three very important things: first, it eliminated the duty to 
retreat for a defender that is in a place he has the legal right to be; second, it  removed civil 
liability for those acting under the law; third, it  established  a presumption of reasonable fear for 
the individual claiming self-defense (Cheng and Hoekstra 1).  The first accomplishment is what 
really changed the face of self-defense in Florida. Prior to the passage of this law, Florida 
operated under the English  common law duty to retreat unless a person was in his home or 
“castle” (Sykes v. State of Florida, 68 Fla. 348 (1914) ).  While at common law only a person’s 
home could be his “castle”, the Florida law creates “innumerable” castles in any place a person 
has the legal right to be and is under no duty to retreat (Catafalmo 539). This could include a 
school, sidewalk, or a park.  
Of course this major shift from Florida’s legal norm caused some division. Critics of the 
law included  “Dan Gelber, one of twenty representatives who voted against the bill, stated that 
‘[i]t legalizes dueling. It legalizes fighting to the point of death, without anybody having a duty 
to retreat’ "  (Weaver 397). Another common critique by prosecutors is that the law 
“unnecessarily expanded the right to use deadly force in self-defense”  (Weaver 397.) On the 
other hand, proponents such as  “Congressman Dennis Baxley stated that the law made sense 
because requiring a duty to retreat was ‘a good way to get shot in the back,’ and the new law 
would deter criminals . . . ”  (Zbrzenj 257).  Former NRA President  Marion Hammer asserted 
that these laws are necessary because more often than not the victim was being prosecuted 
(Weaver 397). Despite the division, the law did not stop at the borders of the Sunshine State. 
After Florida’s passage of the law, the law has been put in effect in over twenty states, with 
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many of those states being in the South (Cheng and  Hoekstra  2). The death and subsequent trial 
of a Florida teen killed by a self-appointed neighbor watchmen, who claimed self-defense, 
captured the attention of many  jurisdictions and forced them to reevaluate their “Stand Your 
Ground” laws. 
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METHOD 
This paper will analyze the self-defense laws  of eight Southeastern states: Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,  and Tennessee. The 
selected pool of states to be analyzed was composed for several reasons. First, Florida should be 
included because it is  the inaugural “Stand Your Ground” state that many other states have 
emulated. A “Stand Your Ground” state is a state  that statutorily  allows its citizens to respond 
to an attack with physical force, including deadly force, in any place where he or she has the 
legal right to be without first retreating and offers civil and/or criminal immunity to citizens 
acting under the law. Florida is also important because its inclusion allows the author to examine 
how subsequent “Stand Your Ground” states have stayed uniform to Florida’s statute or strayed 
away. 
When determining what other states were to include in this study,  it became quickly 
apparent to the author that all the states  that bordered Florida were “Stand Your Ground”  states, 
such as, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. Then looking  at the states that bordered those 
states, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, one would notice  
that all of these states were “Stand Your Ground” states also, with the exception of Arkansas, 
which is not included in this  sample. It may surprise many to realize that basically the whole 
southern region has adopted the “Stand Your Ground” law.  
Each of the states in this study will have their own chapter. Each  state’s chapter will 
discuss the self-defense laws of that  state prior to the passage of “Stand Your Ground”, how the  
states arrived at “Stand Your Ground,” compare the statute to Florida’s, and look at the aftermath 
of “Stand Your Ground” in that  state.  In Florida’s chapter, instead of a comparison section, the 
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thesis will focus on critiques of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law. This is important because if 
a state’s statute is strikingly similar to Florida’s, then those critiques can also to apply to it. An 
observation of the Florida statute was that after its passage, the number of justifiable homicides 
had a dramatic increase in subsequent years. Successful claims of self-defense under “Stand 
Your Ground” are classified as justifiable homicides. In the aftermath sections, there will be a 
table showing the number of justifiable homicides in the state prior to and after “Stand Your 
Ground.”  The researcher was only able to obtain this information for Florida, Georgia, 
Tennessee, and South Carolina because the other states do not keep statistics on their number of 
justifiable homicides. That aftermath section will also look at key cases and proposed legislation 
since the passage of “Stand Your Ground.”  Also, for clarification purposes, the relevant portions 
of the statutes section will focus on sections added or amended after Florida’s passage of “Stand 
Your Ground.” 
As previously mentioned, “Stand Your Ground” has had major popularity in the Southern 
jurisdictions of America.  After examining the states, the author will explore the South’s “culture 
of honor” as possible explanation for this occurrence. The conclusion of this thesis will address 
Florida’s influence in  other states adopting “Stand Your Ground”, commonalities of the law 
among the states, the South’s culture of honor role in the adoption of “Stand Your Ground” laws, 
and the future of the law. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 To complete the required research, the author consulted relevant cases, statutes, 
law review articles, jury instructions, and books  for each jurisdiction in this study.  A 
supplemental resource was  the newspapers from these jurisdictions. They provided key 
information as to what was going on in these jurisdictions that aided the passage of “Stand Your 
Ground” and incidents that did not make it to court; information that was not included in a case’s 
opinion or in a statute. The researcher also contacted state agencies, such as the Florida 
Department of Enforcement and its equivalent in other states, for the number of  justifiable 
homicides in the state in years preceding and subsequent to the passage of “Stand Your Ground.” 
For the “Culture of Honor” section, relevant books were consulted. 
In the process of completing this thesis, the researcher  found numerous law review 
articles that were Florida centered and chose five to complete the Florida section.  These articles 
were all written after the passage of “Stand Your Ground.”  On the other hand, the researcher 
was only able to find three law review articles for all the other jurisdictions combined. One for 
Alabama, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Only the Alabama article was written after the passage of  
“Stand Your Ground.” 
The dominant sources utilized in analyzing each state were the primary sources of law, 
namely states statutes and cases of each of the eight jurisdictions. As this thesis is intended to be 
an original analysis of the law between eight different jurisdictions, the author utilized secondary 
sources only to provide context or to clear up ambiguities in the state law when one looked at 
state statutes or cases alone. 
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CHAPTER 1: FLORIDA 
Prior To “Stand Your Ground” 
 Prior to  Florida’s passage of  “Stand Your Ground” in 2005, Florida found itself among 
the minority of states that imposed a duty to retreat (Zbrzenj 240). It is interesting to note that 
Florida’s statutes remained mute on this until the early 2000s. In fact, the duty to retreat first 
appeared in the Florida statutes in 2005 ( ironically, the same year it was abolished) (Fla. Stat. 
776.012). While the Florida statutes remained silent on this point, it was the judiciary who 
consistently remained vocal in favor of the duty to retreat.  
 The jury instructions approved by the Florida Supreme Court in  Sykes v. State of 
Florida, 68 Fla. 348 (1914),  established how self-defense would operate in Florida by saying:  
A defendant reasonably free from fault is under no duty to retreat from an 
assailant, where he reasonably believes that to retreat would increase his peril, but 
in order to justify a killing under the claim of self defense, the slayer must be 
reasonably free from fault in bringing on the difficulty. He must not have been the 
intentional aggressor in bringing   on the difficulty, and he must have resorted to 
all reasonable means (within his knowledge) and at his command, consistent with 
his own safety, to avoid the necessity of taking human life. If the defendant was 
the intentional aggressor, or if the defendant was not reasonably free from fault in 
bringing on the difficulty, or if there were any other reasonable means at the 
defendant's command (within his knowledge) consistent with his own safety, to 
which he could have resorted instead of killing the deceased, if he did kill him, 
then he could not justify his act on the ground of self-defense. (68 Fla.  at 349) 
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This jury instruction shows just how difficult it was for someone to free himself from the duty to 
retreat.  The defendant could not be the aggressor in the situation, had to  reasonably believe that 
retreat would not put him in more danger, and used reasonable modes to avoid the situation.  The 
reasoning behind placing such a large burden on the defendant was to save lives. The Florida 
judiciary felt that by retreating from an altercation both the attacked and his attacker’s lives 
would be spared, instead of them fighting it out and putting both their lives at risk (Zbrzenj 241). 
This theme of fighting back as a last resort can be seen in other cases. In the Thompson v. State 
of Florida, 552 So. 2d 264 (1989),  the Second District Court of Appeals stated,“ There is a duty 
to retreat in the face of a felonious attack before using deadly force on the attacker but deadly 
force is justifiable if retreat would be futile” (So. 2d 264 at 266). In the earlier case of Danford v. 
The State of Florida, 43 So. 593 (1907), the Florida Supreme Court gave a similar opinion by 
stating, “It cannot be denied that it is the duty of a party to avoid a difficulty which he has reason 
to believe is imminent, if he may do so without apparently exposing himself to death or great 
bodily harm” (43 So. at 596). The reader may wonder when does the duty to retreat end.  The 
Fifth District Court of Appeal shed some light on this issue in Brown v. State of Florida, 454 
So.2d 596 (1984). In this case,  the court reversed Brown’s murder  conviction. The court based 
its reversal on Brown’s attempted retreat and lack of an avenue of escape. This is illustrated in 
the court’s opinion below: 
Defendant did what he could to extricate himself from the situation and armed 
himself for protection. He attempted to retreat from the battle, but Williams 
pursued him. As defendant retreated he continued to ask Williams to stay away, to 
break it off, to leave him alone, but Williams continued to  stalk him, fists balled 
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and ready to inflict damage. Defendant fired a shot into the ground, still retreating 
and still asking Williams to stay away, but Williams came on relentlessly. The 
evidence is clear that defendant fired the second and fatal shot because there was 
no alternative, because Williams had closed in on him and had defendant turned 
to run, Williams would have been on him. (454 So.2d  at 600-601) 
The “no alternative” in the second to last line of the above quote illustrates how serious the 
Florida’s courts were in enforcing the “retreat to the wall” standard in Florida. 
 Florida recognized one place where the duty to retreat did not apply: the home.  The 
Florida judiciary kept the castle doctrine alive and well in Florida. Much like the duty to retreat, 
it would not appear in the Florida statutes until 2005 (Fla. Stat. 776.013). However, that did not 
stop the courts from enforcing it in their decisions. In Hedges v. State of Florida, 172 So. 2d 824 
(1965), the Florida Supreme Court stated, “. . .  [W]hen one is violently assaulted in his own 
house or immediately surrounding premises, he is not obliged to retreat but may stand his ground 
and use such force as prudence and caution would dictate as necessary to avoid death or great 
bodily harm. When in his home he has "retreated to the wall” (172 So. 2d  at 827). Subsequent 
cases would add more details to this principle. For example, in Weiand v. State of Florida, 732 
So. 2d 1044 (1999) the Florida Supreme Court brought Florida in line with the major of states by 
establishing that even in a dispute with co-habitants there was no duty to retreat. Another case of 
interest to note is Baker v. State of Florida, 506 So. 2d 1056 (1987). The court refused apply the 
castle doctrine to the defendant’s  car because of the “mobility” of a car (506 So. 2d at 1059). 
This case illustrates how restrictive the court was in its application of the castle doctrine. 
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Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
In 2004, the National Rifle Association ,NRA,  had put the passage of “Stand Your 
Ground” in Florida on its agenda. A common reason behind this decision is the concept of 
“Stand Your Ground” being a gun law (Zbrzenj 266). It is considered to be a gun law because it 
permits the use of “deadly force”. Florida Statute 776.06 defines “deadly force” as  “force that is 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm” and the firing of a firearm is listed in the examples. 
“Stand Your Ground” was not the first gun law that Florida preceded the rest of states in passing. 
In 1987, Florida was  the first state to pass the  right-to-carry law which allowed Florida citizens 
to carry concealed firearms with a permit (Olorunnipa). Also, the law required police to license 
all eligible applicants for concealed carry permits. Before the law, law enforcement agencies 
could discriminate in who they gave a permit to. Under the law,  law enforcement agencies must 
give a permit to anyone who meet these requirements: the applicant is at least 21, “[d]oes not 
suffer from a physical disability which interferes with safe handling of a firearm, has not been 
convicted of a felony ; has not been convicted of a drug charge in the preceding three years; has 
not been confined for alcohol problems in the preceding three years; has completed any of a 
number of firearms safety classes; and has not been committed to a mental hospital in the 
preceding five years” (Cramer and Kopel). In research completed by the NRA, forty states 
completely outlawed or had strict regulations before Florida’s passage of the law. However, by 
2005, thirty-eight  states had followed Florida’s lead (Begos, Stockfisch). This research indicates 
that the NRA was cognizant of Florida being a potential influence to other states in matters of 
gun policy and was likely betting on a repeat to happen with “Stand Your Ground.” 
14 
 
Another related reason is the publicity that the law’s passage in Florida would receive. 
The NRA’s plan was also to get “Stand Your Ground” passed in other jurisdictions as well.  But, 
legislators in other jurisdictions could not pass a law that they had never heard of. When Florida 
was considering the “right to carry” law it received a substantial amount of national attention. 
The NRA was most likely hoping for the same thing to happen with “Stand Your Ground.” Also, 
Florida was in the minority of states that operated under the duty to retreat.  Having Florida 
throw away over a century of common law would be sure to capture some attention. However, if 
the NRA chose a state that already had no duty to retreat, it would not have been that much of a 
change as compared to Florida. Also, Florida’s passage could add to the validity of the law. If  
Florida was willing to throw away its established tradition for something new, it would send the 
message to other states that this way is the proper direction for self-defense. In fact, Marion 
Hammer, former president of the NRA, credited the publicity garnered by Florida’s passage  as 
being instrumental in the NRA being able to get it passed in other jurisdictions (Leskanic). 
“Stand Your Ground” easily made its way through the Florida legislature.  In March 23, 
2005, it passed the Senate  in a dominating  thirty-nine to zero vote (“Protection of Persons”).  
Two weeks later it passed the House of Representatives in a ninety-four to twenty vote 
(“Protection of Persons”). Former Governor Jeb Bush signed the bill on April 26, 2005 with 
Marion Hammer, at his side (Royse). The NRA had knocked down its first domino. 
Criticisms of “Stand Your Ground” 
Various law review articles focus on the dysfunctions of the Florida’s  “Stand Your 
Ground Law.”  Recurring themes are  problems with eliminating the duty to retreat, problems in 
expanding the castle doctrine, the vagueness of  the term “unlawful” activity in the statute,  and 
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the provision providing  immunity from criminal and civil prosecution for those who act in so-
called self- defense. Florida  Statute  §776.013(3) effectively eliminated the duty to retreat by 
stating: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any 
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the 
right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force 
if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great 
bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
To fully comprehend the magnitude of this statute, it is necessary to reflect back on the 
common law duty to retreat. The rationale behind this principle was to defuse a situation or de-
escalate a potentially dangerous encounter. The main goal was to preserve human life (Jenson 
and  Nugent- Borakove 5). If a defender was successfully able to escape, then not only would his 
life have been saved but also the lives of any innocent bystanders that could have been caught in 
the altercation.  Under this rationale, defendants knew they had to make an effort to retreat first 
before attacking.  Attacking was the last resort and it could prove to be very costly if the 
defendant was not able to prove that it was his last resort at trial. However, Florida’s current 
statute  makes attacking a first choice. Under Florida's law, "anytime one claims to perceive a 
threat, that individual would be justified in reacting violently; they would have little incentive to 
diffuse the situation by retreating” (Feingold and Lorang 226)  This statute promotes escalation 
of a conflict rather  than duty to retreat’s de-escalation.   Moreover, the statute allows citizens to 
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“react automatically  by encouraging people to take immediate action if they perceive a person to 
be threatening or suspicious” (Feingold and Lorang 227). 
 Expanding the castle doctrine has also faced much criticism. Florida  Statute  §776.013 is 
the relevant section to this issue and it states:  
A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great 
bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended 
or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: 
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of 
unlawfully and forcibly entering , or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, 
residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle; and 
(b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful 
and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. 
The key word in this statute is “presumed.”  In this context, presumed means that citizens using 
force are automatically given the benefit of the doubt that they had a reasonable fear of serious 
bodily harm or death. On the surface, this provision seems ideal. Someone who used self-defense 
in the appropriate way should not deal with the added stress of being investigated. This statute 
has replaced the common law “reasonable person” standard with this “presumption of 
reasonableness” (Jenson and  Nugent- Borakove 6). Under  the reasonable person standard, a 
person would have to prove that their conduct was reasonable under the circumstances he faced.   
Law Professor Anthony  Sebok illustrates why this change in standards can be problematic.  He 
points out that this statue goes against the long held legal belief that life outweighs the value of  
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property.  He demonstrates this point with the anecdote of a student breaking into a teacher’s car 
to vandalize it. The teacher discovers the student and shoots him. Under “Stand Your Ground,” 
the teacher is entitled  to the “presumption of reasonableness” and is therefore justified in using 
deadly force and would not face criminal penalties .  The presumed reasonable fear of death or 
great bodily harm of the defender and the malicious intent of an intruder allows “the victim of 
intrusion”  too  much latitude to use deadly force. These presumptions allow  the use of deadly 
force, even if non-deadly or no force would have been reasonable (Weaver 404- 405).  For 
example in the hypothetical student- teacher example, the teacher could have held the student at 
gunpoint until the police arrived. This situation violates the principle of life carrying more value 
than property because the student was basically killed over a car. If the police caught him and he 
was prosecuted, he might have received  a minor penalty but nothing remotely close to death. At 
this juncture,  it is important to note that previously the Florida courts refused to apply the  castle 
doctrine to automobiles as mentioned earlier in Baker, but presently the automobile is  elevated 
to the special status that the home once occupied  alone, even though the automobile is a 
probable tool of retreat. 
The presumption also allows a person within his "castle" to act without any fear of 
punishment, even if he or she has no reasonable fear, knows the intruder does not have any 
malicious intent, or knows that the use of deadly force is unreasonable. An example of this is a 
2006  incident between neighbors in Clearwater, Florida. Kenneth Allen shot his neighbor Jason 
Rosenbloom twice while he was in Allen’s doorway. Allen had reported Rosenbloom for putting 
out more garbage bags than the local ordinance permitted.   Rosenbloom knocked on Allen’s 
door to confront him  and an argument ensued. Allen said that Rosenbloom had  his foot in the 
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door and attempted to rush in his home before he pulled the trigger.  Rosenbloom refuted this 
claim. While accounts vary on what exactly occurred, no one can disagree about   Rosenbloom  
being shot twice , once in the stomach and another in the chest. After the incident Allen stated 
that he was afraid and that he had a right to keep his home safe.  All Allen had to show was that 
Rosenbloom "unlawfully" and "forcibly" entered or attempted to enter his home  and that he 
knew  such entry was occurring when he shot Rosenbloom. If Allen proved this, then he is 
presumed to have the reasonable fear necessary to justify using deadly force. Even if the State 
could prove that Allen did not fear Rosenbloom , could see that he was plainly unarmed, and had 
no malicious intent, it is irrelevant because the presumption was in favor of Allen (Weaver 412, 
413). Consequently, the state decided not to pursue charges and said the Allen’s claim on self-
defense was well-founded and he was not arrested (Brown).  
The presumption has changed the game for prosecutors. “This presumption prevents 
prosecutors—and the jury—from considering the actual facts that show whether the force used 
was reasonable or unreasonable, essentially eliminating prosecutorial discretion in evaluating 
whether the use of deadly force was justified” (Janson and Nugent- Borakove  6). Once the 
presumption is in place, prosecutors have the difficult task to refute it.   Russell Smith, former 
president of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, said that, “the real impact [of 
the law] has been that it's making filing decisions difficult for prosecutors. It's causing cases to 
not be filed at all or to be filed with reduced charges.” Also, ex- Duval County State Attorney 
Shorstein referenced five cases where this has happened. These cases included an incident where 
a man was shot by a motorist following an argument where the man allegedly attacked the 
motorist, an incident where a man was shot and killed by an acquaintance in a domestic 
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dispute,and a road rage episode where a woman was stabbed to death by another woman 
(Weaver 405-406). “Stand Your Ground”  has eroded self-defense from being a defense that is 
proven at trial  to a plea bargaining tool and a hindrance to prosecution.  In these cases, the 
defendants have the ball in their courts  because the people that could counter their stories  tend 
to be dead. Thinking about their own self-interest, defendants are unlikely to offer testimony that 
threatens their freedom (Wallace 40). 
 Prosecutors are not the only people affected by this presumption; officers are too. Florida 
Statute § 776.032 (2) offers officers vague guidelines by stating:  
“A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of 
force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest for using force unless 
it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful.”  
Probable cause is required for an arrest. Establishing probable cause is almost impossible 
because law enforcement must “presume” the use of force was lawful in compliance  with  
section 776.013. Because law enforcement is only authorized to investigate unlawful acts, it is 
essentially precluded from investigating violent acts occurring within an occupied vehicle, 
dwelling, and residence. As a result, probable cause can never be established where an individual 
commits a violent act within these locations (Megale 118). Another issue is that this vague 
statute allows officers a great amount of discretion in incidents outside these locations.  This law 
is essentially asking Florida’s over three hundred distinct law enforcement  agencies  to  use their 
standard procedures for investigating without any clear guidelines (Wallace 39). This is almost 
like having a race with over three hundred participants, not designating a specific route, and just 
shouting “go”. Similar to what would happen in the race, the law enforcement agencies appear to 
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all be going in different directions. For example, in an examination of  five months of court 
records for Lake, Orange, Osceola, Polk, Seminole, and Volusia counties  "widespread 
differences in the way claims are investigated and prosecuted" was discovered.  In Seminole 
County incident, an off-duty officer was detained and charged by the sheriff’s office after using 
deadly force at his friend’s home because he was in fear of  his life. The sheriff’s office 
requested the help of the prosecutor. After the prosecutor’s interview, the prosecutor said that the 
officer’s claim of self-defense was valid because there was no evidence to refute his claim. 
However in Orange County , the Sheriff’s Office did not discuss the case with the prosecutor’s 
office before   coming to  the conclusion that it would not charge a home-owner who shot and 
wounded an inebriated intruder. In another Orange County incident, officers did not even look at 
an incident when a teenage male was shot in the back of the leg while allegedly trying to steal a 
vehicle by the owner’s husband (Weaver 409).  This discretion by officers is especially alarming 
because self-defense claims have tripled in Florida since the enactment of “Stand Your Ground” 
(“Florida Stand Your Ground”)  and over-worked officers might allow their personal bias to 
influence what cases they want to thoroughly investigate (Jenson and  Nugent- Borakove 8). 
Officers are the first step in a self-defense claim. Any bias or miss-step on their part could skew 
the whole outcome and a criminal could be left unprosecuted and a victim left dead.  
Another problematic aspect of the law is the use of term “unlawful activity” as used in 
Florida Statute § 776.013(3), which is listed at the top of page fifteen. Basically, the user of self-
defense cannot be engaged in an unlawful activity when using self-defense. Interestingly, the 
unlawful activity does not have to be related to the act of self-defense. For example, a person 
who is driving without a license is not entitled to the presumption of reasonableness if someone 
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breaks into his occupied vehicle  and attacks him. While someone who is in the same situation 
and has his driver’s license on him, would be granted the presumption of reasonableness (Megale 
122); even though, having a driver’s license is unrelated to the attack or act of self-defense. Also,   
this phrase’s vagueness leaves more questions than answers. Associate Professor Megale at 
Barry School of Law illustrates some of those key  questions, “Must the activity rise to the level 
of a felony, or is a misdemeanor sufficient? Must law enforcement charge the crime for it to be 
used in withholding the presumption of reasonable fear?” (122)  An incident often used to 
illustrate how critical it is to  have a precise definition of this phrase  is the Galas case. In this 
Port St. Richey case, Jacqueline Galas, a known prostitute, went over to her frequent client, 
Frank Labiento’s, home to carry out their usual exchange of sex for money. Only this time it was 
different. Labiento pulled out a gun to shoot Galas. Galas pleaded for her life and tried to calm 
him down. Fortunately the phone rang, and Labiento turned away from Galas to answer the 
phone and left the gun on the table. When he returned, Galas  had retrieved the gun and fired a 
fatal shot to his chest. Galas was arrested and charged with second degree murder . The 
prosecutor dropped the charges because he said that her claim of self-defense was valid (Lake).  
Critics of this decision mentioned that Galas was engaged in an unlawful activity as a prostitute 
and should not be protected under “Stand Your Ground”  (Zbrzeznj 262). By not offering a 
definition of “unlawful activity”, the law leaves prosecutors and officers a lot of leeway in using 
their discretion in determining  what acts constitute unlawful activity and who  is entitled to self-
defense’s protections (Weaver 412). When dealing with a law that pertains to life, death, and 
liberty, more concrete parameters should be set.  
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 The Florida legislature granted civil and criminal immunity for those acting in self-
defense with Florida Statute § 776.032 (1), which states:  
A person who uses forces s. 776.12, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in using such 
force and is immune from the criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such 
force . . .   
The rationale behind this law “is to eliminate the fear of prosecution experienced by those who 
may act in self-defense (Megale 119).” However, the lack of  guidelines for enforcing this law 
has created opportunities for inconsistent application of the statute (Megale 119). This is best 
illustrated in the cases of Hair v. State of Florida, 17 So. 3d 804 (2009)  and State of Florida v. 
Heckman, 993 So. 2d 1004 (2007). In Hair v. State of Florida, the First District Court of Appeal 
held that the immunity applied to Jimmy Hair after he shot and killed an intruder  who allegedly 
attacked him through the open window in a car. Interestingly, Hair shot the intruder  while the 
intruder was retreating.  The court stated that the law “makes no exception from the immunity 
when the victim is in retreat” (17 So.3d  at 806). Conversely, in State of Florida v. Heckman , the 
Second District Court of Appeals said, “immunity does not apply [where] the victim was 
retreating” (993 So. 2d at 1004).  In this case, Heckman shot an intruder after the intruder left 
Heckman’s garage. This court held that Heckman was not going to be given immunity. These 
contrasting rulings in these factually similar cases illustrate how there should be more guidelines 
in this statute to promote uniform application. Another problem with this part of the law is how it 
bars innocent bystanders or their families from seeking criminal and civil remedies. For example, 
suppose someone is negligent and reckless in their use of self-defense and shoots and kills not 
only their attacker but a child.  The 2006 Shardavia Jenkins incident, helped to shine some light 
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on this gray area. In  Miami, Damon Darling and Laroy Larose, two rival gang members, began 
to shoot at each other. Nine-year old Shardavia Jenkins was caught in the crossfire and shot in 
the neck. Jenkins died in her mother’s arms (Wright). Darling claimed that he should be entitled 
to immunity because it was defending himself from Larose. His immunity hinged on his self-
defense claim. His claim ultimately failed and he was convicted instead of manslaughter, instead 
of the higher charge of second degree murder (Wright). He has continued to claim immunity 
under self-defense on appeal for years. Without a doubt, his use of an AK-47 and involvement in 
a gang played a role in his defense failing, but what about cases when the citizens are otherwise 
law abiding?  
Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
Justifiable Homicides 
Table 1: Florida's Number of Justifiable Homicides 
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The data was collected from  the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, FDLE.  The 
FDLE  defines “justifiable homicide” as “the killing of the perpetrator of a serious criminal 
offense either by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty or by a private citizen, during the 
commission of a serious criminal offense.”  To obtain a clearer picture of the relationship 
between “Stand Your Ground” and justifiable homicides the above table only includes justifiable 
homicides committed by private citizens. The law went into effect October 2005, so 2008 is a 
good starting point for comparison of the number of justifiable homicides after the law’s 
passage. From 2000 to 2005, the number of civilian justifiable homicides ranged from a low of 
eight to a high of sixteen.  The average of this period was exactly twelve killings per year. On the 
other hand, from 2008 to 2012, the numbers ranged from forty to a high of sixty-seven killings. 
While the 2000 to 2004 period never experienced more than twenty  justifiable homicides in a 
year,  from 2008 to 2012 the number constantly was in the forty’s. The outlier being 2012, with a 
total of sixty-seven killings.  The average of this period is about forty homicides per year. The 
average of justifiable homicides increased by  a little over triple after the passage of “Stand Your 
Ground”. The dramatic increase of justifiable homicides after “Stand Your Ground” is 
undeniable. A possible explanation is that  under “Stand Your Ground”  homicides that may have 
been defined as murder or manslaughter can now be considered justifiable homicides because of 
the elimination of the duty to retreat and presumption of reasonableness. 
State of Florida v. Zimmerman 
On February 26, 2012, in Sanford, Florida,  Trayvon Martin was returning to his father’s 
home after purchasing an Arizona Iced Tea and a bag of Skittles from a 7-Eleven . During his 
return, he was noticed by self-appointed  neighborhood watchman George Zimmerman. 
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Zimmerman  thought that Trayvon looked suspicious and called the police. They told him to stay 
put but Zimmerman did not follow their directions. Zimmerman approached Martin and a brawl 
ensued.  In the end, Zimmerman shot and killed Martin. Zimmerman told the police that it was 
self-defense. Since no one could rebut Zimmerman’s claim,  he could not be arrested at that time  
under the “Stand Your Ground” law .  The whole country was captivated by this story. President 
Barack Obama referenced Martin in a speech by saying, “Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 
years ago” (Caputo).  Rallies were held around the country, and people, from college students to 
Congressmen,  wore hoodies as a tribute to Martin. All eyes were on Florida to see what would 
be done. The Sanford Police Department faced heavy criticism for not arresting Zimmerman for 
forty-four days (Salmon).  The massive attention caused Governor Rick Scott to appoint State 
Attorney Angela Corey to act as special prosecutor on the case. On April 11, 2012, the State of 
Florida charged Zimmerman with second-degree murder (Feingold and Lorang  214- 216). The 
trial began in June 2013 (Gutman). In July, George Zimmerman was found not guilty of second-
degree murder.   A positive  result from this  horrific event was that many  states and lawmakers  
began examining their own  “Stand Your Ground”  laws to ensure that a situation like this is 
would not be repeated.   
Rick Scott’s Task Force 
 Due the nationwide  criticism that Florida faced for “Stand Your Ground” from the 
Trayvon Martin incident,  Gov. Rick Scott assigned  a nineteen person panel to analyze the law 
and make recommendations to  him and the Florida legislature  for action that  they should take 
(Kassab). Members of the force included judges, criminal defense attorneys, prosecutors, and 
law enforcement officers (Dara).  Instead of  recommending significant adjustments to the law, 
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the force basically said that the law was fine the way it was.  Its primary recommendation was 
that law enforcement should limit neighborhood watch groups to observing and reporting  
activities and not to “pursue, confront or provoke potential suspects" (Dara). Gov. Scott has 
stated that he is standing by the task force’s recommendation and  said , “I believe “Stand Your 
Ground” should stay in the books” (Ferriss). The Senate has taken the task force’s 
recommendation to heart and have developed S.B. 130 which requires the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement to create “a uniform training curriculum for county sheriffs and municipal 
police departments to use in training participants in neighborhood crime watch programs” (“Use 
of Deadly Force”). 
Proposed Legislation 
 Throughout the years, Florida has had numerous proposed bills aimed at both restricting 
the protections of self-defense and broadening it. For example, in response to Jenkins incident 
mentioned previously, Senate Bill 878   was introduced to the Florida Senate and House Bill 371 
was introduced to the Florida House of Representatives in 2007. A goal of these bills was to  
remove criminal and civil immunity to defendants who harm innocent bystanders. Another 
provision called for the addition of a  definition of unlawful activity to be added to the “Stand 
Your Ground” statute: “ activity undertaken by a person which is prohibited by laws of this 
state” (H.B. 371; S.B 838). The last provision required that a person’s use of deadly force in self-
defense be based on a belief from an overt act committed by the  supposed aggressor.  Neither of 
these bills were able to make it past their respective houses (H.B. 371; S.B 838). Another 2007 
bill was Individual Personal Private Property Protection Act of 2007. This bill would not allow 
businesses to prevent their employees, customers, or invitees from bringing a gun into the 
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business’ parking lot and storing them in their vehicles. This bill also did not make much 
progress (H.B. 1417). However, 2008’s Preservation & Protection of the Right to Keep & Bear 
Arms in Motor Vehicles Act with the same provision passed the House in a vote of seventy-two 
to forty-two, the Senate on a vote of twenty-six to  thirteen, and was signed by the governor in 
April that year (H.B. 503). Other notable passages are 2008’s  S.B. 948, which increased the 
length of concealed gun licenses from five to seven years, and 2012’s H.B. 5601 ,which reduced 
the maximum fees for concealed weapons license from  eighty- five dollars to seventy-five 
dollars. Whether then the reader thinking of these bills individually, the author urges the reader 
to think of them as operating in tandem. By lowering the price and making the licenses last 
longer, legislators are encouraging people to obtain licenses and weapons. A key provision of  
“Stand Your Ground”  is that a person cannot be engaged in unlawful activity. Using a gun that 
one is not legally authorized to use or possess, should disqualify someone from the protections 
under “Stand Your Ground.” Having a license does make a significant difference. In regards to 
businesses not being allowed to restrict employees, invitees, and customers from storing a gun in 
their cars, it allows employees, invitees, and customers to have access to a gun in a place of a 
business in case they need to use them for self-defense. 
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CHAPTER 2: ALABAMA 
Prior to “Stand Your Ground” 
 Similar to Florida, Alabama found itself among the minority of states that imposed the 
duty to retreat for most of its history (Bobo 353). Former Alabama Supreme Court Judge George 
Washington Stone was a leader in laying the foundation for this (Bobo 353). He sat on the bench 
for twenty seven years from 1856 -1865 and 1876 – 1894 (Brown 21).  One of his chief concerns 
was the sacredness of human life (Brown 21). He grew tired of lives lost in street fights and 
personal disputes not only in his state but the South as a whole (Bobo 353). A solution he came 
up with was to limit the law of self-defense (Brown 21). He saw and got the rest of the court to 
see that imposing the duty to retreat was essential in achieving this goal (Bobo 353). According 
to Stone, “its observance would exert a wholesome restraint on unbridled passion and 
lawlessness, and would, in the end preserve to the commonwealth and many valuable lives” 
(Brown 23). 
 Judge Stone and the rest of the Alabama Supreme court  first solidified Alabama’s 
obedience to the  duty to retreat in  Judge v. State of Alabama, 58 Ala. 406 (1877). In this case, 
Wallace was the foreman of plough squad on a plantation. Part of his job was to ensure that his 
subordinates did their assigned tasks. He instructed the defendant Judge to  hurry up with his 
work. Judge took exception to this command and a confrontation ensued. Wallace went into his 
right pocket for what Judge thought was a knife. Judge hurriedly picked up a wagon standard and 
hit Wallace four times with it. Members of the plough squad were able to separate the two. When 
Wallace got up, Judge hit him one last time in the head. He would die a few hours from a 
fractured skull due to the attack (58 Ala. at 406).  Stone wrote on behalf of the court, “. . .no man 
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stands excused for taking human life, if, with safety to his own person, he could have avoided or 
retired from the combat. . .” (58 Ala.  at 413). 
 The Alabama Supreme Court would elaborate on this statement in  Carter v. State of 
Alabama, 82 Ala. 13 (1886), by saying:  
 The duty of retreat which is imposed by law upon combatants, under certain 
circumstances, has in view the prevention or avoidance of unnecessary bloodshed. The 
right of self-defense can not innocently be carried to the last resort of taking human life 
until the defendant has availed himself of all proper means in his power to decline 
combat by retreat, provided there is open to him a safe mode of escape--that is, when he 
can safely and conveniently retreat without putting himself at a disadvantage by 
increasing his own peril in the combat. Where this can be done, the law assumes that the 
tendency of the act of retreating will be to make the necessity of taking life less urgent 
and imperious. The defendant is not excused from the performance of this duty, where it 
exists, by the fact that he will not be placed on a better vantage-ground, or in less peril 
than before. If retreat does not apparently place him in greater peril, he must resort to it as 
a means of avoiding the necessity of taking life. (82 Ala.  at 15) 
Throughout the years, the Alabama judiciary was the sole voice of  the duty of retreat. In 1975, 
the duty found another voice: the Alabama  legislature. The duty was  first codified in the 
Alabama Code of 1975 (Bobo 354). 1975’s Alabama Code § 13A-3-23(b)  affirmed what the 
courts had been doing  for years by stating, "a person is not justified in using deadly physical 
force upon another person if it reasonably appears or he knows that he can avoid the necessity of 
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using such force with complete safety." Alabama now had both statutory and judicial support for 
the duty to retreat. 
 While Alabama was in outlier in imposing the duty to retreat, it was in agreement with 
the majority of jurisdictions in applying the castle doctrine. In  Storey v. State of Alabama, 71 
Ala. 329 (1882), Alabama’s Supreme Court clearly stated, “Of course, where one is attacked in 
his own dwelling-house, he is never required to retreat. His "house is his castle," and the law 
permits him to protect its sanctity from every unlawful invasion” (71 Ala  at 337).  It is important 
not to assume that not having the duty to retreat in the home is an automatic right to kill. 
Alabama’s Supreme Court made this distinction in  Carroll v. State of Alabama, 23 Ala. 28 
(1853), by stating:  
The owner may resist the entry, but he has no right to kill, unless it be rendered necessary 
to prevent a felonious destruction of his property, or to defend himself against  loss of 
life, or great bodily harm. If he kills when there is not a reasonable ground of 
apprehension of imminent danger to his person or property, it is manslaughter; and if 
done with malice, express or implied, it is then murder. (23 Ala.  at 36) 
Much like the duty to retreat, this principle was also codified in the Code of Alabama 1975. 
Section 13A-3-25(a) stated: “A person in lawful possession or control of premises . . . may use 
physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it 
necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted 
commission of a criminal trespass by the other person in or upon such premises.”  Alabama had 
firmly established both the duty to retreat and castle doctrine through case law and statutory law. 
These principles would remain mostly untouched until 2006. 
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Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
The NRA’s success in Florida motivated  it to pursue other states .  In addition to all the 
media coverage that the passage in Florida received, the NRA publicized it on its website and 
magazine (“This Train”). The publications were more than just bragging; the NRA hoped to 
attract the attention of other states. This strategy worked in Alabama. An NRA magazine is what 
first informed Alabama Senator Albert Means of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law (Bobo 
360). According to Means, he received “"unbelievable response[s] from his constituents in favor 
of the bill” and decided to sponsor it as a bill in the Senate (Bobo 360). Means’ constituents were 
not the only people in favor of the bill; his fellow Alabama legislators were also on board. On 
February 22, 2006, the bill easily passed the Senate with a vote of thirty to two (S.B. 283) . The 
bill was then sent to the House where it received eighty-two votes in favor and nine against (S.B. 
283). The bill was then sent to then Gov. Riley who signed it into law on April 4, 2006 (S.B. 
283). With this signature Alabama became the second “Stand Your Ground” state (White). 
Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law 
Many of the principles embedded in Florida’s law can be seen in Alabama’s law as well. 
The most obvious being the “stand your ground” provision that abolished the previous duty to 
retreat in both of these jurisdictions . Alabama’s 13A-3-23(b) states: “A person who is justified 
under subsection (a) in using physical force, including deadly physical force, and who is not 
engaged in an unlawful activity and is in any place where he or she has the right to be has no 
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground.”  Florida’s § 776.013 (3) as quoted on 
page fifteen sets out the same requirements. 
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Another similarity is these jurisdictions extending the castle doctrine to places outside the 
home. Alabama’s section 13A-3-23 (a) (4) permits the use of physical force, including deadly 
force, if the defender reasonably believes the attacker is “[i]n the process of unlawfully and 
forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcefully entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied 
vehicle, or federally licensed nuclear power facility.”   Florida section 776.013 (a) contains 
almost the same wording except it does not mention anything about nuclear power facilities. In 
regards to automobiles, both these jurisdictions have historically refused to apply the castle 
doctrine to vehicles but now do.  
Both of their statutes have also eliminated the reasonable person standard and  replaced it 
with the presumption of reasonableness. Under Florida’s section 776.013 (1): “A person is 
presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death 
or great bodily harm to another if. . .” Alabama’s section 13A-3-23(a) addresses this by saying: 
A person may use deadly physical force, and is legally presumed to be justified in using deadly 
physical force in self-defense or the defense of another person pursuant to subdivision (4), if the 
person reasonably believes that another person is. . .”   However, these jurisdictions differ in 
when this presumption applies.  In Florida,  it applies when  the attacker was about to or already 
had unlawfully and  forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle or if the attacker 
removed or attempted to remove an inhabitant of one of these places. Another requirement is that 
the defender “knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and 
forcible act was occurring or had occurred” (Fla. Stat. 776.013 (b)). The ending  of Alabama’s 
section 13A-3-23 (a) (4)  has almost the same exact wording.   However, other provisions of the 
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Alabama Code added more requirements. For example, the presumption applies if the defender 
believes the attacker is “using or about to use unlawful deadly physical”, “using or about to use 
unlawful deadly physical force against an occupant of a dwelling while committing or attempting 
to commit a burglary of such dwelling” (Ala. Code Sec. 13A-3-23 (a)(1)), “committing or about 
to commit a kidnapping in any degree, assault in the first or second degree” (Ala. Code Sec. 
13A-3-23 (a)(2), and “committing or about to commit burglary in any degree, robbery in any 
degree, forcible rape, or forcible sodomy” (Ala. Code Sec. 13A-3-23 (a)(3)). 
While the two jurisdictions differ on the requirements, they have the same exceptions for 
the presumption. Both Florida’s 776.013 2(a)- (d) and Alabama’s (4) (a) – (d) include similar 
exceptions when the presumption will not apply. Some of these exceptions  include if defensive 
force is used against   a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, the defender is 
engaged in unlawful activity, the defender is using the dwelling, residence, or vehicle for 
unlawful activity, and using defensive force against a law officer while he is performing the 
duties required by his job.  
The last two similarities to note are the provisions on officer investigations and civil and 
criminal immunity. Alabama’s 13A-3-23 (e) states: “A law enforcement agency may use 
standard procedures for investigating the use of force described in subsection (a), but the agency 
may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the 
force used was unlawful.”  This precise language can be found in the Florida’s statute with the 
exception of the subsection reference. In both these jurisdictions, a new law was passed without 
any specific instructions to the enforcers of the law. On another note, Alabama followed 
Florida’s lead by providing civil and criminal immunity for anyone that uses force in accordance 
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with  its “Stand Your Ground”  law (Ala. Code 13A-3-23 (d). Before the passage of “Stand Your 
Ground” in Alabama, a successful claim of self-defense did not “abolish or impair civil remedy 
or right of action which is otherwise available” (Ala. Code sec. 13A-3-21). 
Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
 Proposed Legislation 
 The Trayvon Martin incident did bring a call for repeal or reform of “Stand Your 
Ground”  in Alabama. However, this call has largely gone ignored. For example, in 2012, 
Representative Coleman-Evans proposed the “Trayvon Martin” amendment which would 
preclude “Stand Your Ground” from being invoked by a person that followed or pursued 
someone prior to an altercation. This proposal did not even make it past the House (H.B.  694). 
Two other legislators, Democratic Rep. Alvin Holmes and Democratic Sen. Hank Sanders,  have 
voiced their goal of introducing a bill to  completely repeal the law in the next legislative session 
(Johnson). However, if  Coleman-Evans’ minor amendment was met with such resistance, a 
complete repeal seems unlikely. While the Trayvon Martin incident captured the attention of 
Alabama legislators, a quote from Senator Beason might be indicative of the general mood in the 
Alabama legislature, “he said  he was hesitant on passing legislation “based on a single situation” 
(Chandler). 
 Instead of “Stand Your Ground” being weakened, proposed legislation has been  aimed at 
strengthening it. One such measure is S.B. 286. This bill expands the castle doctrine  to “allow 
businesses the right of self-defense against intruders, allow a person to carry a pistol on the 
property of another under certain conditions, and  employers may not restrict or prohibit the 
transportation or storage of a lawfully possessed firearm in an employee's privately-owned motor 
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vehicle while parked in a public or private parking area if that employee satisfies certain 
conditions”. The bill passed the Senate on a vote of twenty-five to eight on April 4th , 2013 (S.B. 
286). On May 2nd , 2013, the bill passed the House on a vote of seventy-four  to twenty-seven 
(S.B. 286). The bill is waiting for the signature of Alabama’s governor.  Another measure is H.B. 
46. According to one of the bill’s supporters Senator Orr, an existing loophole in the law would 
allow thieves to file civil suits against homeowners and business owners if they are injured while 
intruding. In past cases, some thieves have been awarded monetary damages after being injured 
by property owners (Banaszak).  If the bill becomes law it could prevent criminals from suing 
homeowners and businesses under most circumstances. On February 23, 2012 , the bill passed 
the House on a dominating ninety  to zero vote and on May 16, 2012, won the Senate in a 
twenty-nine to one  vote (H.B. 46). It would go on to be enacted. 
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CHAPTER 3: GEORGIA 
Prior to “Stand Your Ground” 
Throughout its history, Georgia has aligned itself with states that did not follow the duty 
to retreat. Glover v. State of Georgia, 105 Ga. 597 (1898), set the precedent for this. In this case, 
Glover and another man were attending a dance. An altercation occurred between the two and 
Glover shot and killed the man.  Glover was convicted of murder at the trial level. When the 
Georgia Supreme Court weighed in it said: 
Under section 70 of the Penal Code, one who is himself free from fault may, without 
retreating, use whatever force is necessary to protect himself from a felonious assault, 
even to taking the life of his assailant, and be justifiable. So under section 71, one free 
from fault may, without retreating, take human life and be justifiable, if the circumstances 
are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felonious assault is about to be 
made upon him, and the slayer, who is free from blame, acts under the influence of such 
fears, with the bona fide purpose of preventing the felony from being committed upon 
him. (105 Ga. at 599) 
The phrase “if the  circumstances are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man . . . “ 
indicate that Georgia’s judiciary was applying the reasonable person standard. Subsequent 
rulings would follow the no duty to retreat principle established in this case. For example, in 
Scott vs. State of Georgia, 141 Ga. App. 848 (1977), the Court of Appeals reversed Scott’s 
conviction because the trial court had incorrectly imposed the duty to retreat in his case (141 Ga. 
App.  at 850). A similar situation would happen in   Johnson vs. State of Georgia, 253 Ga. 37 
(1984). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision for imposing the duty to retreat 
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on a defendant. In its opinion the court made a few interesting comments: “We hold that where 
self-defense is the sole defense, and the issue of retreat   is raised by the evidence or placed in 
issue, the defense is entitled to a charge on the principles of retreat as set forth in Glover” (253 
Ga.  at 39). Almost a hundred years after  Glover’s ruling, Georgia courts were still using it as a 
guide in their decisions. It is important to note that Georgia’s statutes remained mute on the duty 
to retreat for the majority of this state’s history. However, this did not make the principles 
established in Glover any less concrete as indicted by the second notable comment from 
Johnson: “In our view, silence of the present code on the issue of when duty to retreat may arise 
was not intended to eliminate the principles pronounced in Glover” (253 Ga. at 38). 
 Georgia not only followed the majority of jurisdictions in not enforcing the duty to retreat 
but also in utilizing the castle doctrine. Unlike the no duty to retreat rule, the castle doctrine has 
had statutory support for a large part of Georgia’s history. For instance, in the Cobb’s Digest of 
1851, Georgia’s leading statutory authority at the time, the provisions were explicitly stated: 
If, after persuasion, remonstrance, or other . . . gentle measures used, a forcible attack and 
invasion on the property or habitation of another cannot be prevented, it shall be 
justifiable homicide to kill the person so forcibly attacking and invading the property or 
habitation of another ; but it must appear that such killing was absolutely necessary to 
prevent such attack and invasion, and that a serious injury was intended, or might accrue 
to the person, property or family of the person. (821) 
Although numerous codes would be passed, this section would be left largely intact. For 
instance, Section 26-1013 of the Code of Georgia of 1933,published 82 years after the  Cobb’s 
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Digest, contains the same exact language. In fact, the statute would not receive any major 
revisions until the 1968 Georgia Legislature intervened and changed it to read: 
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate 
such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however, he is justified in the 
use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if: 
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner and he reasonably 
believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering 
personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary 
to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; or 
(2) He reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of 
the felony. (§ 26-903)  
Although the language was changed and expanded,  the main idea of allowing force, including 
deadly,to hinder an unlawful entry into a habitation or an attack directed at someone in the 
habitation remained. Also, in the previous version the use of defensive force had to appear to be 
necessary; a reader may wonder what constitutes necessary. The 1968 version answers this by 
imposing the reasonable person standard. The defender must reasonably believe that the force he 
utilizes is necessary. Currently, Georgia’s § 16-3-23 (a) applies the reasonable person standard  
 The last important revision would come in 1998 when the Georgia legislature defined 
habitation as “any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business” (O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.1). 
Georgia had gone beyond the traditional castle doctrine. With this provision and Georgia not 
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imposing the duty to retreat, it already had some features in common with other “Stand Your 
Ground” states. 
Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
In 2006,  NRA spokesperson Autumn Fogg stated that after “winning a gun brawl in with 
gun-control proponents in Florida last year” the group was moving to pass “Stand Your Ground” 
law in sixteen states (Billips,Ramati). Georgia was one of the states on the list because of its 
already existing “Stand Your Ground”-esque  provisions. It was not enough that Georgia case 
law said that there was no duty to retreat. The NRA  wanted the Georgia statutes to say it also as 
Fogg indicated with this statement: "We want to make sure that the law is very clearly stated that 
citizens no longer have a duty to retreat" (Billips, Ramati). After viewing Florida’s 2005 passage 
of “Stand Your Ground”, Georgia Senator Goggans decided introduce his own  version in 
Georgia in the form of S.B. 396 (Badertscher; Eckenrode). Goggan’s rationale was that in 1998  
Georgia granted its citizens the right to carry a concealed firearm and that “Stand Your Ground” 
would allow law-abiding citizens to be able to use their firearms to defend themselves without a 
“fear of persecution” if they feel threatened (Goggans). Other senators did not feel this way. For 
example, according to Senator  Thomas, “I would be afraid for my own life walking down the 
street if someone doesn't like me. The language is so arbitrary to say if you are threatened that 
you can attack” (Eckenrode). Despite some dissension in the Georgia Senate, on March 2, 2006, 
the bill passed on a vote of forty  to thirteen (S.B. 396). On March 24, 2006, the bill passed the 
House on a vote of one hundred and seventeen to fifteen. The  bill became law with the signature 
of then Governor Sonny Purdue and went into effect on July 1, 2006 (S.B. 396). 
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Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law 
The  passage of “Stand Your Ground” in Georgia did not have a dramatic effect on its 
statutes like it did in other  states. Georgia simply added § 16-3-23.1 and § 16-3-24.2   to its 
already established self-defense statutes. Georgia’s § 16-3-23.1 is similar to  Florida’s 776.013 
(3) in that both abolish the duty to retreat in their jurisdictions and allow citizens to stand their 
ground. A difference is that the Georgia version says nothing about citizens having to be in a 
place where they have the legal right to be; this is assumed, but Florida version explicitly states 
it.  
Georgia’s § 16-3-24.2 is the equivalent to Florida’s  § 776.032. Both of these statutes 
apply immunity to those that act in self-defense according to the jurisdiction’s statutes. However, 
Florida grants immunity from criminal charges and civil suits. Georgia only grants immunity 
from criminal prosecution.  Also, Georgia does not grant immunity if the defender  possessed or 
used a weapon that it was illegal for him to possess or use. While the Florida’s “Stand Your 
Ground” does not specifically address the illegal possession or use of a weapon disqualifying 
someone from being eligible for the immunity, 776.013 (c) requires that the defender not be 
involved in illegal activity for him to receive “Stand Your Ground’s” protections. The illegal 
possession or use of a weapon should preclude someone from receiving immunity.  
Georgia’s “Stand Your Ground” is notable for key  aspects that it does not include in 
relation to Florida’s. Georgia makes no mention of the  presumption of reasonableness that 
Florida established in  § 776.013. Instead, Georgia has continued to follow the reasonable person 
standard. Another aspect, is how Florida addresses the behavior of law enforcement in 776.032 
(2) by stating, “the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that 
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there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful”.  Georgia, on the other hand, 
did not include any provision addressing its law enforcement officers upon the passage of its 
“Stand Your Ground” law. 
Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
Justifiable Homicides 
Table 2: Georgia's Number of Justifiable Homicides 
 
  
    Georgia’s justifiable homicides data is collected by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, GBI. 
It uses a similar definition for justifiable homicide as Florida’s Department of Law Enforcement: 
“the killing of a felon by a peace officer in the line of duty” and “the killing of a felon, during the 
commission of a felony, by a private citizen” (GBI). The GBI  separates those justifiable homicides 
committed by citizens from those committed by law enforcement.  The above data reflects the 
former.  
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     Georgia’s “Stand Your Ground” law went into effect July 1, 2006.  2008 is a good starting 
point to examine the number of justifiable homicides committed by private citizens in Georgia. 
From the 2008 to 2012 period, there is a high of  twenty-two  justifiable homicides in 2010 and a 
low of eleven in 2011. The average for this period is roughly thirteen.  In looking at the three 
years prior to “Stand Your  Ground” being passed the high was seven killings in 2004 and the 
low was five killings in 2005. The average of this period is exactly six. So between these two 
periods, the average of justifiable homicides doubled.  
 Another interesting happening to note is that after the largest number of justifiable 
homicides in 2010, the numbers of 2011 and 2012 are similar to those of pre-“Stand Your 
Ground” years. Also, the number of justifiable homicides from the 2008 to 2012 period has some 
interesting fluctuations. For example, 2010’s twenty-two killings, the peak year, doubles the 
previous year’s number. However, 2011’s five killings is the smallest thus far in Georgia’s 
“Stand Your Ground” era. These fluctuations make it difficult to draw any concrete conclusions 
about the data. In contrast, Florida’s numbers remained constantly in the forties after the passage 
of “Stand Your Ground” except with 2012’s high of sixty-seven killings. Also while Georgia’s 
average of justifiable homicides doubled under “Stand Your Ground”  from six to twelve, this 
increase is not as dramatic as Florida going from twelve to thirty-six.  
Proposed Legislation 
 There has been an attempted expansion of gun rights in years after the passage of “Stand 
Your Ground” in Georgia. 2013 was a major year for such proposed expansions. The reader 
should be reminded that “Stand Your Ground” is a gun law and the expansion of another gun law 
can strengthen “Stand Your Ground.” While “Stand Your Ground” gives a defender the 
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opportunity to stand his ground and kill if he has to in any place where he has the legal right to 
be,  proposals have attempted to ensure that a defendant will have access to a weapon in such a 
situation. For example, The “Georgia Constitutional Carry Act of 2013” was introduced. This 
bill called for the deletion of  O.C.G.A § 12-3-10 (2) which prohibits the use or possession of 
any firearm other than a handgun in a historic site, park, or recreational area. Another feature of 
this bill is the introduction of the designation of someone being a “lawful weapons carrier”. To 
fall into this category a person must meet one of three requirements: the person is not prohibited 
by law to possess a weapon, is licensed in Georgia to carry a handgun or weapon, or licensed to 
carry a weapon or handgun in other state.  The act proposes that this term take the place of 
license holder in Georgia’s statutes. A license holder is someone who holds a valid weapons 
carry license. This group has certain privileges; for example, it is able to carry a weapon in any 
location in the state unless prohibited by law and its employers cannot stop it from storing a 
weapon  in its workplaces parking lot (H.B. 26). By supplanting this group with the more 
inclusive group, more people would be allowed to carry weapons. Another proposed bill was 
H.B. 28, also known as the “Restoring Private Property Rights for Places of Worship Act of 
2013”. The goal of the bill is to legalize  someone being able to carry a gun into a place of 
worship. Similarly H.B. 29 ,or “Georgia Campus Carry Act of 2013”, would legalize the 
possession of a weapon on the campuses of post-secondary educational institutions, most notably  
colleges and universities. As of August 2013, none of the bills have been able to progress past 
Georgia’s House of Representatives (H.B. 26; H.B. 28; H.B. 29). 
 Not all 2013 proposed legislation was aimed at strengthening “Stand Your Ground”. For 
example, S.B. 147 narrowed the scope of no duty to retreat to only instances that involve  the 
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defense of habitation and personal property but eliminated it in instances where the defender  is 
defending himself or another person. As of February 2013, no further action was taken on the bill 
and it remained in Georgia’s Senate (S.B. 147). As of August 2013, the “Stand Your Ground” 
statute is the same as when it was passed.  
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CHAPTER 4: MISSISSIPPPI  
Prior to “Stand Your Ground” 
 From the 1800s and onward, Mississippi courts did not impose the duty to retreat. For 
example, in  Long v.  State of Alabama, 52 Miss. 23 (1876), the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
stated in its opinion, “Flight is a mode of escaping danger to which a party is not bound to resort, 
so long as he is in a place where he has a right to be, and is neither engaged in an unlawful 
enterprise, nor the provoker of, nor the aggressor in, the combat. In such case he may stand his 
ground and resist force by force, taking care that his resistance be not disproportioned   to the 
attack” (52 Miss. at 19-20). It is interesting to note how closely of some of the verbiage used in 
this ruling parallels the verbiage used in Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” statute. For example, 
unlawful enterprise is analogous to Florida’s unlawful activity and the requirement that a person 
is in a place where he has a right to be is stated in both this ruling and Florida’s statute. The 
foundation for  “Stand Your Ground” being passed had been formed  more than a century before 
Florida’s passage. 
 Seven years later, in Bangs v. State of Alabama, 61 Miss. 363 (1883),  the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi would concur with its earlier decision of not imposing a duty to retreat by stating, 
“That while a man need not fly to avoid danger, so long as he is where he has the right to be, yet 
he must avoid the danger, if possible, by every other means” (61 Miss.  at 363). In a more  
current example, Chief Justice Waller stated  in the footnotes of   Newell v. State of Alabama,  49 
So. 3d 66 (2010),  “it has always been the law in this state that one has no duty to retreat from an 
attack if he is in a place where he has a right to be and is not the initial aggressor or provoker” 
(So. 3d  at 73).  
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 In regards to statutory support, Hutchinson’s 1848, which contains the laws of 
Mississippi from 1798 to 1848, makes no mention of the duty to retreat or standing one’s ground.  
In regards to self-defense, the statute states that a homicide is justified by  a person: 
When arresting any attempt to murder such person, or to commit any felony upon him or 
her, or in any dwelling house in which person shall be ,or, 
When committed in the lawful defense such person, or of his or her, husband, wife,  
parent, child, master, mistress, or servant, when there shall be reasonable ground to 
apprehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and there 
shall be some imminent danger of such design being accomplished. (ch. 64, art. 12, Title 
3 (2). 
The judiciary read in between the lines when it would not impose the duty to retreat. Also, the  
“reasonable ground to apprehend” clause is indicative that the reasonable person standard was in 
place. In looking at the 1983 version of this statute, the last one before the passage of “Stand of 
Your Ground”  there is still no mention of a duty to retreat or standing one’s ground. In fact, it is 
almost identical with the 1848 version. The only thing changed in the above blockquote is that  
“When committed in the lawful defense such person, or of his or her, husband, wife,  parent, 
child, master, mistress, or servant” became “When committed in the lawful defense of one’s own 
person or any other human being”  (Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 97-3-15 (1)(f)).  Mississippi’s self-
defense stance remained stable prior to “Stand Your Ground.” 
 In regards to the castle doctrine, the previously mentioned statutes hint at the castle 
doctrine by classifying a type of justifiable homicide as preventing the murder of a person or a 
felony committed on the person in a dwelling house. The broad language used says nothing 
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about having to retreat in or standing one’s ground in one’s home or “dwelling house.” However, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi would shade in this gray area in its decisions. In Ayers v. State 
of Mississippi, 60 Miss. 709, 1883 WL 3910 (1883),   in regards to property owners defending 
themselves against trespassers the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated:  
No man is required by law to yield possession of his property to the unlawful claim of 
another. He may defend his possession; and while he may not kill to prevent the trespass, 
he may kill to protect his own person against a deadly assault made by the trespasser on 
him. In other words, one who assaults  a trespasser to prevent the injury threatened is the 
actor but not the aggressor in the difficulty, and he does not lose the right of self-defense 
because he makes the attack. (60 Miss.,1883 WL at *3) 
This ruling essentially states that a property owner can attack a trespasser as  a first option to 
prevent bodily harm. This attack will not disqualify him from claiming self-defense. The court 
would offer a more concise opinion in   Williams v. State of Mississippi, 127 Miss. 851 (1921), 
"A man's house is his castle, and he is never bound to retreat from it. He may stand his ground 
there, and kill a person to prevent his forcible and unlawful entry" (127 Miss. at 860). The 
Supreme Court of Mississippi had once again cleared up the ambiguity of its self-defense statute. 
Prior to the passage of “Stand Your Ground,”  Mississippi appeared to already be set in its ways 
when it came to self-defense. 
Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
 In 2006, the NRA promoted “Stand Your Ground” in Mississippi (Pettus). Two different  
“Stand Your Ground” bills were introduced to Mississippi’s Senate and House of 
Representatives, S.B. 2426 and H.B. 882.  These bills were similar in that they both eliminated 
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the duty to retreat, expanded the castle doctrine to include businesses and automobile, granted 
civil immunity to those that commit lawful self-defense, and established the presumption of 
reasonableness (S.B. 2426 and H.B. 882). These bills differed in that H.B.  882 did not apply the 
presumption of reasonableness to law officers acting within the scope of their duty and applied 
the presumption of reasonableness in a place of business only if the attack occurred when the 
place was business was closed. S.B. 2426  made no mention of the presumption of 
reasonableness being inapplicable to law enforcement officers acting within the boundaries of 
their jobs and the presumption of reasonableness is in place when the attack occurs at a place of 
business or its premises regardless of the time.  These differences played a role in the different 
fates of these two bills. H.B. 882  passed the House on a vote of  one hundred and four  to 
thirteen but failed in the Senate. S.B. 2426 passed the Senate on a vote of thirty-nine to five  and 
passed the House in demanding vote of  one hundred and fifteen to three. The House amended 
the bill to aforementioned clause about the presumption of reasonableness and law enforcement 
officers (S.B. 2426).  Mississippi’s then governor Barbour signed it into law on March 27, 2006. 
It went into effect in  July of that year (S.B. 2426). 
Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground”  Law 
 Mississippi’s and Florida’s  “Stand Your Ground” statute contain numerous 
commonalities. The most obvious being the elimination of the duty to retreat. While Florida 
accomplishes this in Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (3), Mississippi does the same §  97-3-15 (4).  Both 
sections have the same requirements that the defender be in a place where he has the he has the 
legal right to be and not be involved in criminal activity. Florida goes a bit further than 
Mississippi by explicitly stating the phrase, “[he] has the right to stand his . . . ground and meet 
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force with force”. Mississippi’s statute never explicitly states “stand his ground.” However, 
Mississippi’s statute  does state that a person’s failure to retreat cannot be considered by a fact 
finder.  
Another similarity is Mississippi adopting Florida’s definition for a dwelling. 
Mississippi’s §  97-3-15 (c) is the same exact definition as Florida’s § 776.013 (5) (a):  
“ "dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind that has a roof over it, whether the 
building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, including a tent, that is 
designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, including any attached porch.”  
This definition allows the castle doctrine to be applied to places that do not normally  come to 
mind.  For example, a dwelling could be cardboard boxes that a homeless person uses to 
construct a living space that he sleeps in every night. In relation to this, both states’ statutes 
establish a presumption of reasonableness in certain locations. Both states list dwellings and 
occupied vehicles. However,  Mississippi’s §  97-3-15 (3) added business or place of 
employment to the list; on the other hand, Florida’s § 776.013 (a) added the term residence to its 
list.  This term is distinct from dwelling because it applies to guests.  
While the locations may vary, another commonality is the circumstances for the 
presumption to be applied. These sections allow the presumption when the attacker is in the 
process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or already done so from one of the state’s listed 
locations ,or the attacker illegally removed or attempted to illegally remove a person against his 
or her will from one of the state’s listed locations, and the defender knew or had reason to 
believe that an illegal and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. Florida goes a bit further 
by also offering a presumption that applies to the attacker’s intent. According to Fla. Stat. 
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776.013(4), “A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s 
dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an 
unlawful act involving force or violence.” Mississippi’s statutes solely pertain to the mind of the 
defender.  
 The statutes also have some parallels in when the presumption cannot apply. In their 
statutes, the presumption is inapplicable if the defensive force is used against someone that has 
the right to be in the listed locations and if the defender is in engaged in an unlawful activity. 
Mississippi and Florida diverge on the presumption provision concerning law enforcement 
officers. Florida’s § 776.013 (d) states that the presumption does not apply if defensive force is 
used against a law enforcement officer who enters or tries to enter a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle in performance of his duties or if the officer identified himself or if the user of force 
knew or reasonably should know that the person entering or trying to enter the locations stated 
before was a law enforcement officer. Whether than focusing on someone using defensive force 
against an officer, Mississippi’s § 97-3-15 (3) focuses on a law enforcement officer being the 
user of defensive force and does not allow the officer the presumption of reasonableness.  
 Another areas where these statutes differ in regards to the presumption is that Florida has 
some extra provisions. For example, it is not enough to have the right to be in  or be an a lawful 
resident of a  dwelling, residence, or vehicle but the defender must not have an order of 
protection for domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact for the 
presumption to apply(Fla. Stat. §776.013 (2) (a) ) .  Also, the presumption does not apply if “The 
person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful 
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custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is 
used” (Fla. Stat. §776.013 (2) (b) ). 
 Another similarity is that each statute grants some form of immunity. In Mississippi’s § 
97-3-15 5 (b), civil immunity is granted once the defendant has been found not guilty in a 
criminal trial  concerning a claim of self-defense. Florida’s §776.032 (1) grants both civil and 
criminal immunity. The interplay between these elements is important. Criminal immunity 
means that the defender cannot be arrested, charged, or held in custody. It essentially precludes a 
trial from happening. In Mississippi, a trial must occur for civil immunity to be applied. This is 
not the case in Florida.  
 A key difference in the statutes is that Florida’s § 776.032 (2)  advises law enforcement 
to use standard  procedures for investigating these cases and not making an arrest unless it is 
determined that unlawful force was used.  Mississippi’s statute makes no such recommendation 
to its law enforcement agencies.  Overall, Florida’s statute is more far-reaching than 
Mississippi’s. It covers the majority of the provisions in Mississippi’s § 97-3-15 and adds more. 
Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
Proposed Legislation 
 Much like in the previous jurisdictions discussed, Mississippi’s “Stand Your Ground” 
law has been left untouched  since its passage. However, there have been attempts to pass 
additional legislation that would supplement it.  One such measure is 2010’s S.B. 2153. It 
authorized weapons permit holders to carry a firearm onto a public park, into a bar, and into a 
restaurant as long as the governmental body in charge of the park or owner of the bar and 
restaurant has not posted a notice prohibiting the weapon on the premises. According to the bill’s 
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sponsor Former Sen. Merle Flowers, “This bill simply allows folks to protect themselves and 
their families” (Elliot). The connection to “Stand Your Ground” is obvious from this quote and 
the implications of the bill. Former Sen. Flowers mentions protection of self and family. Two 
concepts that are governed under “Stand Your Ground.”  This bill would allow someone to carry 
a gun in these locations and “stand his ground” if he needed to in order to protect himself and his 
family. The bill passed the Senate in a forty-eight to three  vote but died in the House (S.B. 
2153). A similar bill was 2011’s H.B. 405. It applied the same idea presented  in S.B. 215 but in 
churches and other places of worship. This bill was also defeated in the House (H.B. 405). The 
last notable measure is 2011’s H.B. 881. It authorized any person that is licensed to carry a 
concealed pistol and that passes a voluntary course on the safe use and handling of a firearm to 
carry his or her weapons to many places that those with a license to carry but have not passed the 
voluntary course cannot. These places include a courtroom while court is not in session, any 
place where alcoholic beverages are served, college campuses, and any school, college or 
professional athletic event not related to firearms. This bill managed to win the support of the 
House in  a one hundred and seventeen to two vote and dominated the Senate in a fifty to zero 
vote (H.B. 881). It received the signature of the governor and went into effect on July 1, 2011 
(H.B. 881).  The passage of the bill and the proposal of the others indicate that legislation has 
more aimed at strengthening self-defense and gun laws. 
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CHAPTER 5: TENNESSEE  
Prior to “Stand Your Ground” 
 Unlike the previous jurisdictions discussed,  Tennessee’s position on imposing the duty 
to retreat or not to impose the duty  changed prior to Florida’s adoption of the law. In Tennessee, 
the concepts of “Stand Your Ground”  are embodied in “True Man” rule. The “True Man” rule 
states: 
If [a person] when assaulted was without fault and in a place where he had a right to be 
and was placed in reasonable apparent danger of losing his life or of receiving great 
bodily harm, he need not retreat, but may stand his ground, and repel force by force, and 
if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self-defense, he kills his assailant, he is 
justified and should be acquitted. (Mischke 1001) 
In the 1800s, there was a debate on whether this  rule was applicable to Tennessee (Mischke 
1001) . Nelson v.  State of Tennessee, 32 Tenn. 237 (1852), seemed to answer the question for 
the time being.  The Supreme Court of Tennessee said: 
. . . before the defendant could avail himself of the plea of self-defense, that he must 
show that he done everything that he could do, consistent with his own safety, to avoid the 
combat before he slew his adversary, and that he took the life of his adversary only to preserve 
his own life or person, from some great bodily harm. In the language of the old writers upon this 
subject, 'that he must give back to the wall . . .  (256).  
Tennessee was among the states that did recognize the English common law duty to retreat.  
 The precedent established in Nelson would face some conflict. For example, in Morrison 
v. State of Tennessee, 212 Tenn. 633 (1963), The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled: 
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 Thus, if the person assailed is without fault, and in a place where he has a right to be, and 
put in reasonably apparent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, he 
need not retreat, but may stand his ground, repel force by force, and if, in the reasonable 
exercise of his right of self-defense, he kills his assailant, he is justified  (212 Tenn.  at 
641).  
It appeared that the judiciary was  guiding Tennessee toward the “True Man” rule.  However, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court would address the paradox between the rulings in Kennamore v. State 
of Tennessee, 604 S.W. 2d 856 (1980). The court would say that the “True Man” rule was never 
the law in its state. It reconciled the opinion in Morrison with  Kennamore  by saying that the 
defendant in Morrison was defending his home and the “True Man” rule should be restricted to 
defense of  one’s home (604 S.W. 2d at 859). The Tennessee Supreme Court had cemented  
Tennessee’s duty to retreat status by saying: “. . . in the law of excusable homicide is the 
requirement that the slayer must have employed all means in his power, consistent with his own 
safety, to avoid danger and avert the necessity of taking another's life” (604 S.W. 2d at 859) . 
However, nine years later, the 1989 Tennessee legislature would take the state in the opposite 
direction with the passage of  Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-611 (a).  It read:  
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another person when and to the 
degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect 
against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The person must have a 
reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. The 
danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury must be real, or 
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honestly believed to be real at the time, and must be founded upon reasonable grounds. 
There is no duty to retreat before a person threatens or uses force. (39-11-611 (a)) 
The last phrase clearly abolished the duty to retreat in Tennessee. It is also noteworthy the statute 
applies the reasonable person standard with the requirement that the defender “person reasonably 
believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other's use or attempted use of 
unlawful force.”  The 2003 version, the last version before Tennessee adopted “Stand Your 
Ground,”  contained  the same exact wording.  Tennessee was ahead of the previous jurisdictions 
in this study because it had already adopted a statute that eliminated the duty to retreat. To clarify 
for the reader, although Tennessee had a statute that eliminated the duty to retreat, it was not a 
“Stand Your Ground” state by the definition of this study because the statute did not grant civil 
or criminal immunity.  
 In regards to the castle doctrine, its standing in Tennessee has never been in question. As  
the court in the abovementioned Kennamore  stated ,the “True Man” doctrine was applied to the 
defense of the home. In other words, there was no duty to retreat in the home (604 S.W. 2d at 
859). Other rulings concur with this principle. For example the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled 
in State of Tennessee v. Foutch, 96 Tenn. 242 (1896), that a man has the right to protect his home 
and family and that in exercising this right, “He is not required to retreat  or escape from his own 
premises, but may stand his ground, and is not required to give back before he can plead self-
defense” (96 Tenn. at 247). The court in Morrison v.  State of Tennessee, 212 Tenn. 633 (1963), 
added more guidelines for how the castle doctrine  would function in Tennessee: 
In the case of a forcible attack on the habitation, the law does not require that the danger 
should be real -- that is, that the peril should actually exist -- to entitle the householder to 
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resist to the taking of life. The defendant may act upon a reasonable apprehension of 
danger induced by appearances. * * * On the other hand, the law does require that the 
appearance should be such as would excite a reasonable apprehension of the danger of 
peril, in order to render the killing excusable. (212 Tenn. at 640) 
In this case, the intruder was younger, stronger, and heavier than the defendant  and approached 
the defendant in an aggressive,drunken manner. The court weighed these factors and found that 
the defendant’s killing was justified because these factors created a reasonable fear.  The 
reasonable person standard applied to self-defense acts in the home as well. The 1989 Tennessee 
would make a change to this though with 39-11-611 (b). It would apply the presumption of 
reasonableness  to anyone using force against an intruder of their residence. This presumption 
was also appeared in the 2003 version of the statute, the last version before Tennessee adopted 
“Stand Your Ground”. Tennessee was again ahead of other jurisdictions in adopting an element 
that is common to current “Stand Your Ground” statutes. 
Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
 When news of Florida’s adoption of “Stand Your Ground” came to Tennessee, there was 
an initial division on the matter of Tennessee following Florida. One group of legislators felt that 
Tennessee’s self-defense statutes were adequate in their current state.  For example, former Rep. 
Briley said, “if it's the law already, then why change the rules, "especially ones that get into civil 
immunity issues?" (“House Backs Off”). Other dissent focused on the broad definitions that 
Florida had used under “Stand Your Ground.” For instance, former Rep. Fowlkes, did not agree 
with the definition of the term vehicle. According to him, “"Under 'vehicle' it says means of 
conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized. This could be a Greyhound bus, could this 
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not be just a hay wagon?” (“House Backs Off”). He feared that broad definitions could lead to 
confusion and murderers being able to successfully claim self-defense. The group that called for 
the statutory change felt that it was necessary to for citizens to be able to defend themselves. 
According to former Rep. Eric Swafford, “With the number of violent crimes and carjackings 
increasing, people need to have the ability to defend themselves and their families without the 
constant fear of criminal prosecution” (Humphrey). In concurring with  Swafford, Former Sen. 
McLeary said that expanding the self-defense laws would protect “the rights of law-abiding 
citizens instead of the villains” (“Deadly force bill”). This division is reflected in the rocky 
passage of Tennessee’s “Stand Your Ground.”  The first attempt was 2006’s H.B. 3113 and its 
Senate version S.B. 2762. These bills called for the presumption of reasonableness to be applied 
when a person is attacked in his residence, dwelling, or vehicle. Also, both civil and criminal 
immunity would be applied to anyone that lawfully uses self-defense. H.B. 3113 failed to make it 
past the House; while S.B. 2762 swept the Senate in thirty-two to  zero vote in favor of it, it 
would not go on to be passed (H.B. 3113; S.B. 2762). In 2007, H.B.  668 and S.B. 187 proposed 
the same things but each failed to make past its respective chamber (H.B.  668 ;S.B. 187). Also,  
in  2007, H.B. 1907 was introduced.  This bill did apply the presumption of reasonableness to the 
residence, dwelling, and vehicle like the previous bill but added some limitations. For example, 
if a person is attacked in his vehicle and used a weapon for the presumption of reasonableness to 
apply, possession of the weapon  used cannot be illegal. Also, unlike the previous bills, the 
proposal narrowed its scope to just granting civil immunity to those acting under lawful self-
defense. The civil immunity would not applicable to innocent bystanders or other any person that 
unjustified force was directed at. These restrictions seemed to do the trick because this bill swept 
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the House with a ninety-six to zero in favor and performed similarly in the Senate with a thirty to 
zero vote. It would be signed by then Governor Bresden and go into effect June 1, 2007 (H.B. 
1907). 
Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Statute 
  In comparing Tennessee’s statute to Florida’s, Tennessee merged some of its 
elements with Florida’s “Stand Your Ground.” For example, as stated before Tennessee had  
statutorily  abolished the duty to retreat. This is reflected in Tennessee’s § 39-11-611 8 (b) (1). 
This section borrows from Florida’s § 776.013 (3) by requiring that the person not be engaged in 
unlawful activity and be in a place where he has the legal right to be to obtain the right of non-
retreat. This similarly happened in regards to the presumption of reasonableness. As previously 
stated, Tennessee presumed that a person using force likely to cause death or grave bodily harm 
had a reasonable fear of imminent danger when the attacker  illegally forced his way in to the 
defender’s residence This concept can be seen in Tennessee’s § 39-11-611 8 (c). Florida’s § 
776.013 (a) has dwellings and occupied vehicles in addition to the defender’s residence. 
Tennessee’s § 39-11-611 8 (c) would take dwellings and vehicles from Florida’s list and go a 
step further by  adding in business. Two key differences is that Florida’s § 776.013 (3) also 
applies the presumption if the attacker attempts to remove someone against his or will from the 
dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle and Florida’s § 776.013 (4) presumes that “ a person 
who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle  . . .  to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or 
violence.” Tennessee’s statute is quiet on these points.  However, a shocking similarity that their 
statutes share is when the presumption is inapplicable. Tennessee’s § 39-11-611 (8) (d) (1) – (4)  
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mirrors  Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (a) – (d) with the exception of the term business in certain 
provisions. For example, both Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (a)  and Tennessee’s § 39-11-611 (8) (d) 
(1)  say the presumption does not apply if defensive force is used against legal resident of the 
dwelling, residence, or vehicle and there is not a court order preventing the resident from being 
on the dwelling, residence, or vehicle. Tennessee adds business to this list. The presumption is 
also inapplicable if force is used against a person who is the legal guardian of a child or 
grandchild in  an attempt to remove the child or grandchild. The statutes both prohibit the 
presumption “when the defender is engaged in unlawful activity or is using the dwelling, 
residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activity” (Fla Stat.  § 776.013 (2) (c) ). 
Tennessee’s § 39-11-611 (d) (3) includes business in its provision. In regards to force used 
against police officers, Tennessee’s § 39-11-611   (d) (4) and  Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (d) (4) 
both preclude the presumption from being in applied if the force is used against a police officer 
“who  enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle in the performance of his or 
her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable 
law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or 
attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.” 
 Three areas where the statutes diverge are the definition for vehicle, the granting of 
immunity, and officer instructions. As previously stated, members of the Tennessee legislature 
felt that Florida’s definition for vehicle was too broad. The definition is “a conveyance of any 
kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property” (Fla Stat.  § 
776.013 (5) (c) ). Vehicle is customarily synonymous with automobiles. However, this definition 
is also applicable to bicycles, scooters, and even wheelchairs. Tennessee avoids this  ambiguity 
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in § 39-11-611 (8) by defining vehicle as “any motorized vehicle is self-propelled and designed 
for use on public highways”. By specifying that it must be motorized and self-propelled, bicycles 
and non-motorized wheelchairs and scooters are eliminated. The “designed for use on public 
highways” eliminates any wheelchair, scooter, or bicycle.  Both jurisdictions differ in some 
aspects in how they deal with immunity. Florida’s § 776.032 (1) grants both civil and criminal 
immunity to anyone that uses lawful force in self-defense. Tennessee’s § 39-11-622 grants only 
civil immunity to those using lawful force in self-defense. This faces some restrictions not 
contained in Florida’s statute.  The defender ‘s civil immunity does not apply to bystanders or 
other innocent people that were injured during his use of force or property damages caused by  
his use of force.  Both statutes ,however, do not allow any immunity to be applied in an incident 
where force was used against a law enforcement officer who entered or attempted to enter a 
dwelling, residence, vehicles, or in Tennessee’s case a business, to perform his duties, and he 
identified himself in according to the law, or the defender knew or reasonably should know that 
he was an officer of the law (Fla. Stat. § 776.032 (1)).  In regards to officer instructions, 
Florida’s § 776.032 (2) suggests that officers investigate cases involving force with “standard 
procedures.” Tennessee’s statute makes no such suggestion. For the most part, Tennessee had its 
foundation for self-defense established and used Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” to build upon it. 
In some cases, as with the limited civil immunity and re-defining vehicle, it modified Florida’s 
“Stand Your Ground” to satisfy its jurisdiction. While Tennessee may not have completely 
adopted Florida’s law, Florida did have some influence on it. 
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Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” Law 
Justifiable Homicides 
Table 3: Tennessee's Number of Justifiable Homicides 
 
 
 Statistics on justifiable homicides in Tennessee are compiled by the Tennessee Bureau of 
Investigation. It uses the same definition as the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation: “The killing of a perpetrator of a serious criminal offense by a 
peace officer in the line of duty, or the killing, during the commission of a serious criminal 
offense, of the perpetrator by a private individual” (Tennessee Bureau of Investigation). It also, 
like the  other agencies, separates those justifiable homicides committed by private citizens from 
those committed by law enforcement. Tennessee did passed  its “Stand Your Ground” statute in 
2007. In the most recent years prior, 2001- 2006, the number of justifiable homicides committed 
by citizens ranged from a low of thirteen killings  in 2001 and 2004 to a high of 2005’s twenty-
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five. It is interesting to note that a year of increase is always followed by a year of decrease. For 
example, 2005’s high of twenty-five killings  is followed by 2006’s  fourteen, which is the 
second lowest, and  from 2001 to 2002 the number increased from  thirteen to twenty-two, only 
to decrease to eighteen  in 2003. These fluctuations make it difficult to characterize the data from 
this period. The average of this period per year is 17.5 killings. As stated before Tennessee did 
not adopt “Stand Your Ground” until 2007. For analysis of the effects of “Stand Your Ground”, 
this study will examine the data from 2009 – 2012 because by the law was only effect for about 
half of 2007 and 2008 is still too early to see the effects of it.  There is a bit less diversity in this 
sample. The numbers are all in the twenties except for 2009’s ten killings. The range is from 
2009’s  ten justifiable  homicides  to 2011’s twenty-nine. This group’s average is 21.5 justifiable 
homicides  per year.  This is an increase of  four  per year from the earlier group. While it  is an 
increase, it is quite small when compared to Florida’s more than  tripling and Georgia’s doubling 
of justifiable homicides.   
Proposed Legislation 
 Since its adoption,  some proposals have been aimed at Tennessee’s “Stand Your 
Ground”  law. One such proposal is 2007’s H.B.  3509.  It proposed that a person’s business be 
included in the list of places where a person is presumed to have a reasonable fear and therefore 
be justified in using force against an intruder. In  Tennessee’s original “Stand Your Ground” 
statute, only vehicles, residents, and dwellings are given this treatment. However, this bill gained 
approval from both  chambers of Tennessee’s legislature and  the governor (H.B. 3509). It 
became law and the original statute was modified.  Another such measure is 2009’s S.B. 1606. 
This bill called for the elimination of the requirement that the defender cannot be engaged in 
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unlawful activity and officers would have investigate self-defense incidents with “standardized 
procedures”, similar to  Florida’s  provision.  This bill failed to pass (S.B. 1606).  
 Other proposals have had a more indirect relationship with Tennessee’s “Stand Your 
Ground” law. For example, adding businesses to the list of places that the presumption of 
reasonableness apply has inspired quite a few proposals. This provision applies to both the 
owners and employees presumed to have had a reasonable fear when using force likely to cause 
death or great bodily harm. Various proposals have been aimed at ensuring that employees have 
a gun at their businesses of employment and protecting their gun rights. For example, 2011’s 
H.B. 0355 proposed that employers should be prevented  from stopping employees ,who have a 
handgun carry permit, from storing or  transporting a gun in their vehicle that is parked in the 
business’s parking lot. Another measure, 2012’s H.B. 3660, required employers to permit 
employees to carry their guns in their locked vehicles when parking in the business’s parking lot 
that is open to the public. 2012’s S.B. 2992 gave  employees a cause of action if employers 
discriminate in hiring and promotion or demotes an employee because of gun ownership. All of 
these bills failed to become law (H.B. 0335; H.B. 3660; S.B. 2992 ). 
 Other measures were aimed at allowing firearms in more places. 2011’s H.B. 2014  
allowed faculty and staff at post-secondary institutions to carry handguns on campus and 2011’s 
S.B. 0399 authorizes the same thing but on the condition that the faculty or staff member have a 
handgun carry permit. Both 2009’s S.B. 1622 and H.B.  0521  allowed non-faculty or staff 
members to bring guns on campus. All of these measures failed to become law (H.B. 2014; H.B. 
0521; S.B. 0399; S.B. 1622). One interesting measure is 2010’s H.B. 3125. It allowed handgun 
carry permit holders to bring a gun into an establishment that serves alcohol if the permit holder 
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does not consume alcohol and the establishment does not have a posted notice saying that guns 
are not allowed.  Guns and alcohol may not seem like an ideal combination, but this proposal 
managed to pass both chambers of Tennessee’s legislature. However, it was vetoed by the 
governor and then the chambers overrode his veto. It ended up being passed on June 4, 2012 
(H.B. 3125). Except for the inclusion of the term “business” in Tennessee’s “Stand Your 
Ground” law, the law has not undergone any significant changes.  Much like the other 
jurisdictions discussed, the passage of “Stand Your Ground” was followed by attempts  to allow 
guns in numerous locations. 
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CHAPTER 6: LOUISIANA 
Prior to “Stand Your Ground” 
 Early in its history Louisiana did not take a clear stance on imposing the duty to retreat  
( Bennett and  Joseph 1094). For example, in  State of Louisiana v. West, 45 La. Ann. 14 (1893), 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana objected to the trial judge’s jury instruction that, “In order to 
justify a homicide on the ground of self-defence, a person must employ all means within his 
power consistent with his  safety to avoid the danger and avert the necessity, and he must retreat 
if retreat be practicable” (45 La. Ann. at 20-21). The Supreme Court of Louisiana replied by 
saying, “This statement is too broad. There are many cases where a person is not called on to 
employ all the means within his power consistent with his safety to avoid a danger and avert its 
necessity, and there are many cases where a person must not necessarily retreat where retreat is 
practicable” (45 La. Ann. at 21). Instead of definitely stating whether or not  there is a duty to 
retreat, the court’s opinion created a gray area by not differentiating in what cases does a person 
have an obligation to retreat and what cases does he not. Subsequent cases would add more color 
to this gray color. A few months later in  State of Louisiana v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 969 
(1893), The Supreme Court of Louisiana did not agree with the trial judge’s refusal to give this 
charge and said that it was based on “ample authority”: 
If you find, from all the evidence heard upon this trial, that the accused was attacked by 
the deceased and others who manifestly attempted, by violence, to take his life or do him 
great bodily harm, and under such circumstances that no retreat was practicable, then  I 
charge you, if you should so find, that under such conditions the party who is attacked is 
not only not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself 
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from all danger, and if he kill him in so doing it is justifiable self-defence. (45 La. Ann. at 
971- 972) 
In considering this opinion  in conjunction with West, one can infer in cases where retreat is 
practical that there is a duty to retreat and when retreat is impractical there is not  a duty to 
retreat. The Supreme Court of Louisiana  would add a little more color to  this topic in  State of 
Louisiana v. Webb, 157 La. 814 (1925), by stating:  
In order for the plea of self-defense to avail an accused, and to excuse or justify a 
killing by him, .  . he must have retreated, if reasonably possible to do so, if to 
retreat would not have increased his danger or apparent danger, or if his danger 
would have been lessened thereby. There is no duty to retreat, if to do  so would 
increase one's danger. (157 La. 814 at 818) 
This decision appears to logically flow from the one in Thompson. Retreat would be impractical 
if it would increase a defender’s danger. Louisiana appeared to have a grasp on how it would 
handle the duty to retreat. 
 In 1942, the Louisiana legislature would pass the first reliable law regarding self-defense: 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:20 (A)  (1) – (2) (Bennett and Joseph 1083). Before this, “Louisiana's 
substantive criminal law had consisted of numerous overlapping and sometimes conflicting 
criminal statutes superimposed upon a basic system of common law crimes” (Bennett and Joseph 
1083).  
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It  stated: 
A.  A homicide is justifiable: 
(1)  When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in 
imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is 
necessary to save himself from that danger ;or 
(2)  When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving 
danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an 
offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention.  The 
circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would 
be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without 
the killing. (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20 (A)  (1) – (2) (1942)) 
The statute makes no mention of the duty to retreat and stresses reasonableness. This indicates 
that Louisiana was applying the reasonable person standard. It is important to note this language 
has been used in all the subsequent versions of this statute, including the current edition.  The 
statute’s stressing reasonableness would have an impact on the duty to or not to retreat. In cases 
it would be treated as a peripheral issue and reasonableness would take center stage.  The 
Supreme Court of Louisiana would illustrate this point in  State of Louisiana v. Collins, 306 So. 
2d 662 (1975), by stating, “Under the evidence, it was open to the jury to determine whether it 
was reasonably necessary for the defendant to kill in order to save himself. The possibility of 
retreat, for instance, is one of the factors here present for jury determination as to whether the 
defendant had the requisite reasonable belief that it was necessary to kill in self-defense” (306 
So. 2d at 663). The First Circuit Court of Appeal would concur with this ruling in  State of 
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Louisiana v. Stevenson, 447 So. 2d 1125 (1984), by saying, “Although there is no unqualified 
duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is a factor in determining whether or not a defendant had 
the reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid the danger”  (447 So. 2d at 1133). 
Louisiana occupied a middle ground in regards to the duty to retreat or not to retreat prior to the 
passage of its “Stand Your Ground” law. A person could retreat if it was reasonable and did not 
have to if it was not. This principle is not as definite as the states that strictly impose a duty a 
retreat or allow citizens to stand their ground in all places. 
 In regards to the castle doctrine,  the Louisiana Supreme Court set the precedent for how 
it would operate in the state in  State of Louisiana v. J.B. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850), by 
opining that: 
A man may repel force by force in defence of his person, habitation or property, against 
one who manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or surprise   to commit a known 
felony, such as murder, rape, robbery, arson and the like, upon either. In these cases he is 
not obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from all 
danger, and, if he kill him in so doing, it is called justifiable self-defence. (5 La. Ann. 489 
at 490) 
About fifty years  later, the Louisiana Supreme Court would quote this ruling and use it as the 
guiding principle in  State of Louisiana v. Robertson, 50 La. Ann. 92 (1898). The castle 
doctrine’s  scope had been  limited to only felonies.  
 Later statutory provisions would modify  this principle. The 1976 version of  La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14:20 added the castle doctrine to the Louisiana statutes by stating: 
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(3)  When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any 
unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling while committing or attempting to 
commit a burglary of such dwelling. The homicide shall be justifiable even though the 
person does not retreat from the counter when it appears that he would be able to do so. 
(La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20 (3) (1976)) 
This statute narrowed the scope of  castle doctrine even further to just include burglary instead of 
the felonies listed in Chandler. The 1983 edition would add a place of business to this provision 
and apply the castle doctrine to burglaries in a place of business. The edition would also add 
subsection four. It broadened  the scope of the castle doctrine in a case involving the home. 
Under this provision, no burglary had to be committed or attempted, the castle doctrine applied 
as soon as there was unlawful entry in the dwelling. The defender would still have to reasonably 
believe that the force used was necessary to stop the intruder from entering the dwelling or to 
make the intruder leave the dwelling. The last major revision before “Stand Your Ground”  was 
1997’s version including automobiles in subsection three and adding both automobiles and place 
of businesses to subsection four.  This edition gave the home, place of business, and vehicle 
equal standing under the law. Those attacked in these places did not have to retreat and could use 
deadly force if reasonable.  Louisiana was already expanding its castle doctrine years before 
Florida’s adoption of “Stand Your Ground.” 
Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
 In 2006, the NRA began lobbying for “Stand Your Ground” legislation in Louisiana 
(Travis).  It would use the same rationale that it had used to convince other states, “These bills 
give rights back to law-abiding people and force judges and prosecutors to focus on protecting 
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the rights of victims rather than criminals” (Travis). Its lobbying sparked the creation of H.B. 89 
and H.B. 1097. H.B. 89 proposed that the Louisiana justifiable homicide explicitly state that 
there is no duty to retreat and apply the presumption of reasonableness in dwellings, vehicles, 
and place of businesses. On April 24, 2006, it swept the House in a ninety-nine to zero vote and 
did the same in the Senate on a thirty-six to zero vote (H.B. 89). It would be signed by the 
governor and go into effect on August 25, 2006 (H.B. 89). It led to the creation of  a new statute : 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:19, and   it amended La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20. The amendments of 
R.S. 14:20 will be focused on in this thesis because they allow a citizen to stand his ground and 
use deadly force if necessary, fulfilling half of the requirement to make Louisiana  a “Stand Your 
Ground” state. However, R.S. § 14:19 does not allow for deadly force to be used and is therefore 
not relevant to this thesis.  H.B. 1097 proposed the granting of civil immunity to  those that 
commit a homicide in the execution of lawful self-defense under R.S. § 14:19 and R.S. § 14:20. 
On April 20, 2009, it dominated the House in a ninety-five  to one vote in favor and won over the 
Senate in a thirty-four to zero three weeks later (H.B.1097). The governor gave his approval and 
it went into effect on August 25,  2006 (H.B. 1097). It could become La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §  
2800.19 and it fulfilled the second requirement for Louisiana to be considered a “Stand Your 
Ground” state. 
 
Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law 
 For the most part, every section of Louisiana’s “Stand Your Ground” law has a Florida 
counterpart. For example, Louisiana’s § 14:20 (C) parallels Florida’s § 776.013 (3) in that they 
both allow someone who is in a place where he has the right to be and is not engaged in unlawful 
to stand his ground against an attack and use deadly if necessary. Both of these statutes 
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essentially abolished the duty to retreat. In regards to the duty of retreat, an area of Louisiana’s 
statute that Florida does not have an answer for is La. Rev. Stat. Ann.  § 14:20 (D). It dictates 
that a finder of fact is not allowed even to consider the possibility of retreat in determining if the 
deadly force used by the defender was reasonable. This is a direct counter to the prevailing 
principle in Louisiana pre-“Stand Your Ground” that said  the possibility of retreat would be one 
of the factors in determining if the use of deadly force was reasonable. 
 Another area of similarity is the application of the presumption of reasonableness.  
Louisiana’s §14:20 (B) (1) – (2) and Florida’s §776.013 (a) – (b) are in agreement in that in 
order for the presumption to apply the attacker must have been in “the process of unlawfully and 
forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered”  a list of certain locations and the 
defender “knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had 
occurred”  (La. Rev. Stat. Ann.  §14:20 (B) (1) – (2)). Florida’s 776.013 (a) strays a little by 
allowing the attacker’s removal or attempted removal of someone from a list of certain locations 
to substitute for  the attacker attempting or accomplishing unlawful and forceful entry.  The 
reader has probably noted the use of the phrase “list of certain locations.” This is because the 
jurisdiction slightly differ on those locations.  Louisiana’s § 14:20 allows the presumption inside 
a dwelling, vehicle, or place of business. On the other hand, Florida’s § 776.013 (a)  allows it in 
a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. The major differences here being Florida’s allowing it 
a residence and Louisiana’s allowing it in a place of business. Florida included residence so that 
the presumption could apply to the guests in someone else’s home if they had to defend 
themselves against an intruder because dwelling historically only applied to the owner or other 
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habitual inhabitants of the home. Louisiana does not specify if guests are included or excluded 
from the presumption.  
 These jurisdictions differ on when the presumption is inapplicable. Florida’s 776.013 (2) 
(a) – (d) delineate when the presumption does not apply. For example, it does not apply when 
defender attacks someone who has the right to the be in a dwelling, vehicle, or residence , such 
as the owner or lease. Also, it does not apply when used against an officer who identified himself 
and entered the dwelling, residence, or occupied building to  act within the scope of his official 
duties.  Louisiana is mute of the exceptions to the presumption of reasonableness.  The Louisiana 
statute is also lacking in another presumption area. Florida’s § 776.013 (4) presumes that  “(a)  
person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle” is  doing it with the intent to commit an illegal act involving violence or force. 
Louisiana’s statute makes no such presumption. 
 The jurisdictions also differ in the area of immunity and how officers should handle these 
cases. Florida’s § 776.032 (1) grants both civil immunity and criminal immunity to those when 
someone is justified in using force.  Louisiana’s  §2800.19 only grants civil immunity. On 
another note, Florida’s 776.032 (2) suggests   to law enforcement officers that they can use 
standard procedures to investigate self-defense  but demands that they do not make an arrest 
unless they have probable cause. Louisiana’s § 14:20.1 commands law enforcement to conduct a 
full investigation if they are suspicious circumstances surrounding a death or a death results from 
violence and a claim of self-defense is made.  Overall, Florida had a strong influence on 
Louisiana’s “Stand Your Ground” law. More than half of Louisiana’s can be found somewhere 
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in Florida’s statute. However, Louisiana has not blindly adopted a statute that is identical to 
Florida’s; it selected certain provisions from Florida and used them as the foundation for its own. 
Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
 The Trayvon Martin incident shook up the Louisiana legislature and attempts were made 
to amend   Louisiana’s “Stand Your Ground” statute.  One such attempt was 2012’s H.B. 1100.  
It proposed that La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 14:20 be amended and allow finders of fact, such as judges 
or jurors, to consider pursuit in determining if the pursuer was the aggressor. This bill passed the 
House in a vote of fifty-five to thirty-two but failed in the Senate (H.B. 1100). Another attempt 
was S.B. 719. It proposed that a subsection E be added to La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 14:20.  This 
subsection would not allow anyone who initially incited an altercation to have the protections 
under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20. If the altercation resulted in a death of someone other than the 
initial inciter, it would not be considered a justifiable homicide.  It failed to gain support in either 
chamber of the legislature (S.B. 719). Another proposal was S.B. 738. It proposed the creation of 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:20.1 which would require law enforcement officers to conduct a full 
investigation “[w]henever a death results from violence or under suspicious  circumstances and a 
claim of self-defense is raised.” The bill’s sponsor Sen. Morrell hinted that he did not feel like 
this was done in the Trayvon Martin incident by saying, “I've seldom heard of an investigation 
that complicated moving that quickly” (Adelson). The bill won over the Senate in a thirty-one to 
one vote and swept the House in an eighty-seven to zero vote (S.B. 738). It go on to be signed by 
the governor and go into effect June 6, 2012 (S.B. 738). This is the only bill that passed in 
reaction to the Trayvon Martin incident out  of all the states in this study. 
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 Louisiana, like the other states discussed, also had proposals  directed at  expanding gun 
rights. 2006’s H.B. 199 proposed that that handgun permit holders be authorized to carry 
concealed handguns on college and university campuses. It died in the House (Louisiana State 
Legislature). It would be revived again in 2009 as H.B.  27 and be defeated again (Louisiana 
State Legislature). Another proposal was 2012’s S.B. 152, also known as the Louisiana Firearms 
Freedom Act. This bill said that any firearm and firearm accessories produced in Louisiana and 
that remains in Louisiana is immune from federal regulations and is only subject to Louisiana’s 
laws.  S.B. 175 proposed the same idea and had the same fate as S.B. 152: defeat in the Senate 
(Louisiana State Legislature). While Louisiana followed the path of the other states in attempts 
to expand its gun laws, it managed to blaze its own trail with the passage of R.S. 14:20.1 in 
response to the Trayvon Martin incident. 
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CHAPTER 7: SOUTH CAROLINA 
Prior to “Stand Your Ground” 
 Throughout its history, South Carolina has been among the jurisdictions that did impose 
the duty to retreat. The duty to retreat has been upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court  on 
numerous occasions. One such instance is State of South Carolina v. Trammell, 40 S.C. 331 
(1894). At trial the defense objected to this instruction given by the judge, “under the laws of this 
State, if it was necessary to retreat, to avoid shedding human blood, retreat should be made”  (40 
S.C. 331 at 33).  On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court said the judge’s statement was 
correct (40 S.C. 331 at 33).  A similar situation would happen in State of South Carolina v. 
Hardin, 114 S.C. 280 (1920). This time the South Carolina Supreme Court would approve this 
instruction: 
If he has, [the user of force], satisfied you of that, he has got to go a step further and show 
you  that he had no other probable means of escape except to take the life of his assailant. 
The law does not permit one to take human life lightly. If by retreating he can avoid 
taking human life without increasing his own danger of receiving serious bodily harm or 
losing his own life, he must do it. . . . A man must have no other probable means of 
escape except to take the life of his assailant. (114 S.C.  at 280) 
The defense argued that the charge was incorrect because it required the defendant to show that 
he had no other probable means of esacpe, a burden that was went beyond what the law required 
(114 S.C.  at 280) . However, the  South Carolina Supreme Court would characterize the 
instruction as “a clear, lucid exposition of the law”  (114 S.C. 280 at 295). This principle would 
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find itself in other rulings. For example, in State of South Carolina v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271 
(1955),  the South  Carolina Supreme Court ruled :  
Further, he must show that he had no other probable means of escape  except to take the 
life of his assailant or stated another way, that he had no other probable means of 
avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily harm than to act as 
he did in the particular instance; that it is one's duty to avoid taking human life where it is 
possible to prevent it even to the extent of retreating from his adversary unless by doing 
so the danger of being killed or suffering serious bodily harm is increased or it is 
reasonably apparent that such danger would be increased. (227 S.C.  at 279) 
While the duty to retreat has support from case law, until South Carolina’s passage of “Stand 
Your Ground” ,  South Carolina had no statute pertaining to self-defense.  In other words, there 
was no statutory verification of the duty to retreat. The rules of self-defense were exclusively the 
domain of South Carolina’s judiciary. 
The castle doctrine has also been historically recognized in South Carolina. In fact, in the 
previously mentioned State of South  Carolina v. Hardin, 114 S.C. 280 (1920), the  South 
Carolina Supreme Court also approved of this instruction: “When a man is in his own house, he 
need not retreat” (114 S.C. at 280). In another previously  mentioned case, State of South 
Carolina v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271 (1955),  the South  Carolina Supreme Court said: “. .  .a man's 
home is his castle where if he or a member of his family is assaulted in the home, he is not 
required to retreat but may use such force as is reasonably necessary to protect himself or a 
member of his family from death or serious bodily harm and may combine such force as is 
reasonably necessary to eject the assailant even to the extent of taking life” (227 S.C. at 279). 
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The  judiciary would also expand the castle doctrine to include places other than the home. For 
instance, in State of South Carolina v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205 (1921), the court said that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give this instruction: “The law of retreat in self-defense has no 
application where one is on his own premises, and the jury is charged that, where a member of a 
club is in the club rooms and the rooms are owned by the club, the law of retreat does not apply 
to such a club member when attacked by another in the club rooms” (120 S.C. at  207).  The 
court offered this for  its reasoning, “This was error. A man is no more bound to allow himself to 
be run out of his rest room than his workshop”  (120 S.C. at  207).  This ruling would be 
followed by  State of South Carolina v. Bowers et al., 122 S.C. 275 (1923). In this case, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court did not approve of trial judge refusing to give  this instruction:  
One who is assaulted in his own house is not required to retreat before exercising his 
right of self-defense, and I charge you that a man's place of business is within the 
meaning of this rule and is deemed his dwelling, and he need not retreat therefrom in 
order to invoke the benefit of the doctrine of self-defense. (122 S.C. at 279) 
It said that this instruction was “a correct proposition of law” (122 S.C. at 279). Much like the 
duty to retreat, there was no statute regarding the castle doctrine until South Carolina’s adoption 
of “Stand Your Ground.” 
Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
 In 2005,  the same year that Florida adopted “Stand Your Ground,” South Carolina’s 
legislature  put the wheels in motion for “Stand Your Ground’s” passage by prefiling H.B. 4301 
for consideration in 2006 (H.B. 4301). The bill proposed the elimination of the duty to retreat, 
applied the presumption of reasonableness to dwellings, vehicles, and  place of businesses, and 
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granted civil and criminal immunity to those that use justifiable force. Advocates used the same 
reasoning that had been used in other jurisdictions that the law was needed for citizens to be able 
to protect themselves and not have to worry about  being charged with a crime themselves, such 
as  murder (“A Camper’s Tent”).  The bill would sweep the House in a one hundred and six  to 
zero vote on February 8, 2006 and pass the Senate on June 1, 2006;  no votes were recorded 
(H.B. 4301). Former  Governor Mark Sanford would sign it into law and would go into June 9, 
2006 (H.B. 4301). South Carolina had turned its back on over a century’s worth of case law 
upholding the duty to retreat and passed its first self-defense statute. 
Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law 
 Possibly because of South Carolina’s previous lack of  a self-defense statute  of its own, 
it borrowed heavily from Florida’s “Stand Your Ground.”  Florida’s §776.013 (3) and South 
Carolina’s §16-11-440 (C) both eliminate the duty to retreat for someone who is not engaged in 
unlawful activity, who is attacked in any  place where he has the right to place, and allows the 
person to stand his ground under these circumstances. The only distinction being that South 
Carolina’s §16-11-440 (C) includes the phrase “including, but not limited to, his place of 
business”. Florida’s §776.013 (3)   makes no such distinction.  
 Another area where South Carolina and Florida share a similarity with a minor difference 
is the presumption of reasonableness. Florida’s  §776.013 (1) (a) – (b) and South Carolina’s §16-
11-440 (A) (1) – (2) both set out the requirements for the presumption of reasonableness to apply 
to a situation. In both jurisdictions, the presumption is triggered when a person is the process of 
illegally and  forcefully  entered  a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle , or has already done 
so, or attempted to remove someone against his or her volition, and the defender knew or had 
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reason to think that illegal entry was in the process of occurring or had already occurred. The 
laws also share similar provisions regarding when the presumption of reasonableness is 
inapplicable. South Carolina’s §16-11-440 (B) (1) – (4) and Florida’s §776.013  2 (a) – (d) list 
these exceptions. In both statutes, the presumption will not apply if force is used against a person 
who has the right to be in the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, such as the owner or 
leasee, the person that the attempted removal is directed, such as a child, is in the legal custody 
of the person that the defender attacked, the defender is engaged in an unlawful activity or using 
the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to achieve a criminal purpose, and if the defender 
attacks an law enforcement officer who enters or tries to enter the a dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle to carry out the duties of his job and he legally identifies himself, or the 
defender reasonably should know that he was a law enforcement officer.  One place where they 
deviate is that Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (a) states that the presumption can apply if the defender 
uses force against the lawful resident or someone has the right to be inside of a residence, 
dwelling, or occupied vehicle whenever there is an order of protection against the lawful resident 
or occupant for domestic violence. South Carolina’s statute is mute on this point. 
 The statutes share similarities with certain distinctions  in some other important areas as 
well. One example is the presumption of the attacker’s intent. Florida’s § 776.013 (4) and South 
Carolina’s § 16-11-450 (D) both state:  “A person who unlawfully and by force enters or 
attempts to enter a person's dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so 
with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or a violent crime. . .” A language 
difference being that Florida uses the phrase violence instead of a violent crime.  South 
Carolina’s § 16-11-450 (E)  goes a bit farther by declaring that anyone who enters or tries to 
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enter a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle who is  “in violation of an order of protection, 
restraining order, or condition of bond is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an 
unlawful act. . .”  Florida has no such provision.  Another area of congruence is immunity.  
South Carolina’s § 16-11-450 (A) and Florida’s §  776.032 (1) both grant civil and criminal 
immunity to those who used lawful in accordance of these jurisdiction’s statutes.  They both also 
state that the civil and criminal immunities will not apply if the force was used against an officer 
acting within the scope of his duties and who identified himself, or the defender knew or 
reasonably should have known the victim was an officer of the law. A key difference is that 
Florida’s  776.032 (1) talks about the  lawful use of any type of  force. In contrast, South 
Carolina’s § 16-11-450 (A) only specifically discusses “the use of deadly force”. Another 
difference is that Florida’s § 776.032 (1) states that criminal immunity means “no arrest, 
detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.” South Carolina’s § 16-11-450 
(A) does not go to such lengths to clarify what criminal immunity means. The last area is 
providing instructions to law enforcement officers. Florida’s §  776.032 (2) and South Carolina’s 
§ 16-11-450 (B) mirror each other in advising law enforcement officers to use standard 
procedures in these cases but not to make an arrest unless there is probable cause that suggests 
the force used was unlawful. Once again, Florida and South Carolina differ in language. 
Florida’s statute talks about the use of force in general, while South Carolina’s explicitly 
discusses use of deadly force.  
 As evidenced by this comparison, South Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground” is very similar 
to Florida’s. While South Carolina neglects some of Florida’s provisions and adds some of its 
own, it is one the states whose “Stand Your Ground” most strongly resembles Florida’s. 
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Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
Justifiable Homicides 
Table 4: South Carolina's Number of Justifiable Homicides 
 
 
The above data is taken from the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). It 
uses the same definition for  justifiable homicide as the other states in this study “the killing of a 
felon by a peace officer in the line of duty” and “the killing of a felon, during the commission of a 
felony, by a private citizen” (SLED). A difference between SLED and the other agencies that 
provided justifiable homicide statistics is that SLED does not separate justifiable homicides 
committed by  private citizens from those committed by a law enforcement officers.  
To begin, since “Stand Your Ground” went into effect in 2006, the 2000- 2005 should be 
looked at for comparison. Some notables characteristics  in this period are that it has the highest 
number of justifiable homicides in a single year with 2001’s fifteen killings  and also the lowest 
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number  with 2002’s seven killings for the entire 2000- 2011 period.  Another distinction is that each 
year of increase is followed by a year of decrease and a year of decrease is followed by a year of 
increase. In other words, there is never  consecutive years of increase or decrease.  For example, 
2000’s nine increased to 2001’s fifteen but this fifteen decreases to seven in 2002. This pattern is 
followed in 2003- 2005. The average of this period is about 10.8 justifiable homicides per year. 
 The next period for examination is 2008 to 2011 because the law went into effect in late 
2006, 2008 should be a good starting point to see any of its effects. This period is more uniform in 
numbers than the previous period. There were thirteen justifiable homicides for three years, 2008, 
2010, and 201l, and twelve for one year, 2009. This period’s range is from 2009’s twelve kilings to 
other the other years’  thirteen. The average for this period is about 12.8 justifiable homicides for 
year.  There is a subtle increase of about two justifiable homicides per year.  
Proposed Legislation 
 The Trayvon Martin incident sparked some activity in the South Carolina legislature. 
Cognizant of the similarities between South Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground” and Florida’s 
“Stand Your Ground,” legislators recognized that the Trayvon Martin incident could just have 
easily had happened in their state (Beam). One such legislator was Senator Ford. His aim was to 
get rid of the “stand your ground” provision that allows a person who is not engaged in illegal 
activity and he is attacked in a place where he has the right to  stand his ground. He offered 
South Carolina citizens this advice, “"If you're outside your home, call the police, please," the 
senator said. "And if you've got to run, run” (Largen). He introduced his idea in the form of 
2012’s S.B. 1415 to eliminate the “stand your ground” provision. The bill failed to make it even 
past the Senate (S.B. 1415). Rep. Sellers tried the same thing with H.B. 5072 and experienced 
the same result, failure (H.B.5072). The law has remained untouched since its 2006 passage. 
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 Similar legislation proposing the expansion of gun rights would be seen  in this  state as 
other states. For example, 2013’s H.B. 3072 proposed that businesses and public and private 
employers be prohibited from establishing a policy that prevents people from being able to store 
a firearm or ammunition in their vehicles. Another proposal was 2013’s S.B. 308 which would 
allow the carrying of a concealed weapon in a business that sells alcohol unless the business has 
a posted notice that weapon are not allowed. Another proposal was 2007’s H.B. 3964 , which 
proposed that a concealed  weapons permit holder be allowed to carry his weapon onto any 
public educational institution’s property. All of these bills failed to pass but continue to be re-
introduced (H.B. 3072; S.B. 308; H.B. 3964).  One success was 2007’s H.B. 3310, which allows 
a  concealed weapon permit holder to carry around his weapon in his vehicle (H.B. 3310).   
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CHAPTER 8: NORTH  CAROLINA 
Prior to “Stand  Your Ground” 
 Historically, North Carolina has taken a unique stance on the issue of no duty to retreat 
versus the duty to retreat. Whether than advocating one over the other, North Carolina based the 
application of each on the intent of the attacker. The North Carolina Supreme Court set the rule 
of law for this in State of North Carolina v. Dixon, 75 N.C. 275, 1876 WL 2790 (1876) by 
stating: 
A distinction which seems reasonable and is supported by authority, is taken between 
assaults with felonious intent and assaults without felonious intent. In the latter the person 
assaulted may not stand his ground and kill his adversary, if there is any way of escape 
open to him, though he is allowed to repel force by force, and give blow for blow. In this  
class of cases, where there is no deadly purpose, the doctrine of the books applies, that 
one cannot justify the killing of the other, though apparently in self-defence, unless he 
first “retreat to the wall.”In the former class, where the attack is made with murderous 
intent, the person attacked is under no obligation to fly; he may stand his ground and kill 
his adversary, if need be. (N.C. 275, 1876 WL 2790 at *4) 
The court makes the distinction that one has to retreat if not attacked with felonious intent but 
does not have to retreat if he is attacked with felonious intent.  This rule of law would  be 
affirmed in later decisions. For example, in State of North Carolina v. Kennedy, 91 N.C. 572, 
1884 WL 2038 (1884), the court said: 
It is certainly true, as a general rule, that where one is attacked by another who intends to 
murder him, he may, if need be, kill the assailant, and he would in such case be justified, 
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and where the attack is made with murderous intent, the person attacked is not bound to 
flee, but he may stand and kill his adversary if need be. . . But this rule does not apply in 
cases where the attack is a mere assault. In such case, the person assaulted shall not stand 
and kill his adversary, if there be a way of escape for him, but he may be allowed to repel 
force by force, and give blow for blow. (91 N.C. 572, 1884 WL 2038  at *3). 
This case is also important because it sounds some light on what one needs for a successful plea 
of self-defense:  “The jury must be satisfied that, unless he had killed the assailant, he was in 
imminent and manifest danger, either of losing his own life, or suffering enormous bodily harm” 
(91 N.C. 572, 1884 WL 2038  at *3). This opinion hints at the idea of necessity. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court would elaborate on this point in State of North Carolina v. Blevins,138 
N.C. 668 (1905), by saying:  
It has been established in this state by several well-considered decisions that where a man 
is without fault, and a murderous assault is made upon him-an assault with intent to kill-
he is not required to retreat, but may stand his ground, and if he kill his assailant, and it is 
necessary to do so in order to save his own life or protect his person from great bodily 
harm, it is excusable homicide, and will be so held ...  this necessity, real or apparent, to 
be determined by the jury on the facts as they reasonably appeared to him. True, as said 
in one or two of the decisions, this is a doctrine of rare and dangerous application. To 
have the benefit of it, the assaulted party must show that he is free from blame in the 
matter; that the assault upon him was with felonious purpose, and that he took life only 
when it was necessary to protect himself. It is otherwise in ordinary assaults, even with 
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deadly weapons. In such case a man is required to withdraw if he can do so, and to retreat 
as far as consistent with his own safety. (138 N.C.  at 670) 
This ruling added necessity to the self-defense equation and placed a heavy burden on 
defendants. The use of  the phrase “this necessity, real or apparent, to be determined by the jury 
on the facts as they reasonably appeared to him” indicates that the court was applying the 
reasonable person standard. The defendant had to show he played no role in the initiation of the 
confrontation, the attacker had the intent to kill him, and his killing his attacker was necessary to 
save his own life or avoid grave bodily harm. To illustrate how this would play out in court the 
reader’s attention needs to be directed toward the previously mentioned Kennedy. In this case, 
the attacker felt that the defendant was being too friendly with his wife. He followed him into an 
open field and threw a brick at him; it missed. The defendant warned him to stay away numerous 
times and then shot and killed him. The jury found that this was manslaughter, not self-defense, 
and the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed (91 N.C. 572, 1884 WL 2038 at *1) . In applying 
the elements to this case, the court felt that the defendant  fulfilled the requirement of not starting 
the altercation. However, the court felt that he did not meet the other two requirements of 
necessity and the attacker having the intent to kill. In determining necessity, the court considered 
the fact that they were in a wide open field and the defendant could have walked away. Also, the 
defendant had a pistol and had the advantage in the situation compared to the attacker’s brick (91 
N.C. 572, 1884 WL 2038 at *1) . It did not feel that his back was truly to the wall and absolutely 
had to kill to save  his life. In regards to the intent to kill, the court considered how the attacker 
only threw one mis-directed brick and there was no evidence to show that he was going to 
continue the altercation (91 N.C. 572, 1884 WL 2038 at *1). By the court’s line of reasoning, it 
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can be inferred that if he wanted to kill he would have continued to throw  more bricks. The 
cases mentioned thus far would set the standard for how self-defense cases would be decided in 
North Carolina prior to its  2011 passage of “Stand Your Ground.”  These principles would 
remain in the province of the judiciary for the majority of North Carolina’s history because the 
legislature did not pass a statute concerning the duty to retreat or no duty to retreat outside the 
home until “Stand Your Ground.” 
 North Carolina has adhered to the castle doctrine for over a century. In one of the earliest 
recorded castle doctrine cases, State of North Carolina v. Harman, 78 N.C. 515, 1878 WL 2386 
(1878),  the  North Carolina  Supreme Court gave this ruling: 
If upon the prisoner's entering his house and being assailed by the deceased with a knife, 
he entered into a fight with the deceased and stood not entirely on the defensive, and in 
the fight slew the deceased, it would be manslaughter at the most. But if the prisoner 
stood entirely on the defensive and would not have fought but for the attack, and the 
attack threatened death or great bodily harm, and he killed to save himself, then it was 
excusable homicide, although the prisoner did not turn and flee out of his house. For, 
being in his own house, he was not obliged to flee, but had the right to repel force with 
force, and to increase his force, so as not only to resist, but to overcome the assault. (78 
N.C. 515, 1878 WL 2386 at *3) 
The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the trial judge saying, “that the prisoner could 
not be excused unless he retreated to the wall, even if deceased assaulted him with a deadly 
weapon in his own house” ( 78 N.C. 515, 1878 WL 2386 at *2). With this ruling, the court had 
given a man’s home a special status  and made the duty to retreat inapplicable in it. Subsequent 
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decisions would concur with this principle. For example, in State of North Carolina v. Roddey, 
14 S.E.2d 526  (1942), the North Carolina Supreme Court said, “Ordinarily, when a person, who 
is free from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is attacked in his own dwelling or home, the law 
imposes upon him no duty to retreat before he can justify fighting in self defense” (14 S.E.2d at 
528). The court also made it clear in State of North Carolina v. Bryson, 156 S.E. 143 (1930), that 
the felonious or murderous intent element was not required in attacks that occur in the home by 
ruling: “The defendant being in his own home and acting in defense of himself, his family and 
his habitation-the deceased having called him from his sleep in the middle of the night-was not 
required to retreat regardless of the character of the assault” (156 S.E.  at 144). It should be noted 
the castle doctrine was not an automatic license to kill. The court in Bryson would go on to say 
that,  “This, however [not having to retreat when attacked in his home], would not excuse the 
defendant if he employed excessive force in repelling the attack” (156 S.E.  at 144). The court 
illustrated this point more in State of North Carolina v. Robinson, 125 S.E. 617 (1924), by 
saying, “One is permitted to kill in self-defense  but, in the exercise of this right of self-defense, 
more force must not be used than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, and if 
excessive force or unnecessary violence be used, the defendant would be guilty of manslaughter. 
. . but the question of excessive force was to be determined by the jury” (125 S.E. 617 at 619). 
The court was applying the reasonable person standard to castle doctrine cases. The rules of law 
would form the basis for  1993’s N. C. G. S. § 14-51.1. This statute was North Carolina’s first 
and only statute concerning self-defense, although it was only limited to the home. It would 
remain unchanged from 1993 to 2011 until  it was repealed by the  passage “Stand Your 
Ground”  (Orr).  
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Road to “Stand Your Ground” 
 In 2011, the question of  adopting “Stand Your Ground” was introduced in the North 
Carolina legislature. Sources are unclear as to how this happened.  It could have  been due to an 
NRA influence or te that at this point in time many of North Carolina’s southern neighbors had 
adopted “Stand Your Ground.”  The same division seen in the other jurisdictions discussed also 
existed in North Carolina. They were those who felt that the bill  was necessary to protect for 
citizens’ safety and freedom. For example, Sen. Newton said, "So often citizens are faced with 
these threats to their lives, and they really shouldn't have to second-guess themselves and 
worrying about whether they're going to be prosecuted” (“Castle Doctrine Headed to Senate”)  
Concurring with him, Rep. Brown said,  “I'm always going to be for the good, law-abiding 
citizen who is defending themselves" (Binker). Others  felt that the bill could have dangerous 
consequences. For instance, Sen. Blue wondered  questioned the bill’s broad wording and said 
“Why does the bill include the presumption of deadly force for people living or working inside a 
tent. They could include homeless people or a street vendor who fires a weapon when there’s a 
dustup with customers waiting in line” (Robertson). Also,  Roxane Kolar , executive director for 
North Carolinians Against Gun Violence, said the bill would “encourage recklessness and 
protect those who act recklessly” (Binker). Regardless of this division, H.B. 650, North 
Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground”  bill, was introduced to the House in April of 2011. After two 
months, it would win over the House in an eighty to thirty-nine victory, a much smaller margin 
than seen in other states (H.B. 650) . It would have a smoother passage in the Senate on a thirty-
seven to nine vote (H.B. 650). The governor would sign it into law and it would go into effect 
December 2011 (H.B. 650). 
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Comparison to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Statute 
 For the most, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” and North Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground”  
are quite similar except some notable distinctions. To  begin, Florida’s § 776.013 (3) and North 
Carolina’s § 14- 51.3 (a) relieve a person of the duty to retreat if he is attacked in a place here he 
has the legal right to be  and allows him to stand his ground and  kill if “[h]e or she reasonably 
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself or another” (North Carolina’s § 14- 51.3 (a) (1) ). An interesting distinction is that 
Florida’s § 776.013 (3)  adds that the requirement that the defender cannot be engaged in 
unlawful activity.  The closest that North Carolina gets to matching this requirement is  N.C.G.S.  
§ 14- 51.4 (1) which will not relieve a defender of the  duty to retreat if  the defender  “was 
attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of  a felony.” Florida’s 
“unlawful activity” is a catch all term that includes both misdemeanors and felonies. In contrast, 
North Carolina is limited to felonies. 
 Another area to note is how the jurisdictions deal with the presumption of reasonableness. 
North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (b) (1) – (2) and Florida’s § 776.013 (1) (a) – (b) set out the same 
requirements for this presumption to apply: the person who the defender used force against was 
“in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered” a 
list of locations or was trying to remove or already removed another against his wishes from a 
list of specified locations and the defender had knowledge of or reason to believe that the act was 
occurring or had of occurred. These statutes have slightly different lists for locations in which the 
presumption applies.  Florida’s § 776.013 (1) (a) applies the presumption to dwellings, 
residences, and occupied buildings. North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (b) (1) includes a home, motor 
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vehicle, and the most deviating location from Florida, the workplace. North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 
(c) (1) – (5) and Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (a) – (d) list the situations in which the presumption 
would be inapplicable.  Some similarities are that  if the defender uses force against a lawful 
resident of the listed locations who does not have some type of court order like an injunction 
preventing him from being in the locations, the defender uses force against the legal guardian of 
someone like a child that is attempted to be removed from the list of certain locations, and the 
defender uses force against a lawful enforcement officer  who identified himself according to the 
law and the defender knew or should have known that it was a law enforcement officer acting 
within the scope of his duties. These jurisdictions have some distinct differences in their 
exceptions.  For example, while Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (d) does not allow the presumption to be 
allowed if the force is used against law enforcement officers, North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (c) (4) 
includes bail bondsmen along with law enforcement officers. Another distinction revolves  
around Florida’s use of “unlawful activity” once again. Florida’s § 776.013 (2) (d) precludes the 
presumption from applying if the defender is involved in unlawful activity or is the list of 
locations (dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicles). On the other hand, North Carolina’s § 14-
51.2 (c) (3) makes the presumption inapplicable when  “The person who uses defensive force is 
engaged in, attempting to escape from, or using the home, motor vehicle, or workplace to further 
any criminal offense that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any 
individual.” Once again Florida has used the term unlawful activity as an umbrella term that 
could apply to any offense, while North Carolina has chosen to narrow its scope on offenses 
involving threats or violence. Another deviation is North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (5) states that 
presumption does not apply when, “The person against whom the defensive force is used (i) has 
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discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter the home, motor vehicle, or workplace 
and (ii) has exited the home, motor vehicle, or workplace.”  Florida has no equivalent to this 
provision. 
 Other topics for discussion are how the jurisdictions handle the presumption in relation to 
the attacker’s intent, immunity, and guidelines for officers investigating these cases. In regards to 
the presumption relating to the attacker’s intent, both Florida’s § 776.013 (4) and North 
Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (5) (d) both state that “a person who unlawfully enters and by force enters 
or attempts to enter a person’s ... [list of specific locations] is presumed to be doing so with the 
intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.” In Florida, the locations are 
dwellings, residences, and occupied vehicles, and in North Carolina, they are homes, workplaces, 
and motor vehicles. The jurisdictions also handle immunity in the same fashion. North 
Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (5) (e)  and  § 14-51.3 (2) (b) and Florida’s § 776.032 (1) both grant civil 
and criminal immunity to those who use lawful force in self-defense. While Florida’s § 776.032 
(1) applies to force used in all locations and defense of a person, North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (5) 
(e) covers force used in homes, workplaces, and motor vehicles and § 14-51.3 (2) (b) covers 
force used in defense of a person. The jurisdictions handle the exception for obtaining immunity 
a little differently. In both jurisdictions, immunity is inapplicable if force is  used against a law 
enforcement officer who identifies himself according to the law and the defender knew or 
reasonably should have known that he was an officer acting within the scope of his duties. One 
difference is that North Carolina’s § 14-51.2 (5) (e)  and  § 14-51.3 (2) (b) include bailsmen as 
well. The last notable area  is recommendations to law enforcement in how to handle these cases.  
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Florida’s § 776.032 (2) states, “A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for 
investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest the 
person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was 
used was unlawful.”   North Carolina has no equivalent to this provision.  Although North 
Carolina has noticeable differences, its main components can be seen in Florida’s “Stand Your 
Ground.” North Carolina added in elements that it thought was important. 
Aftermath of “Stand Your Ground” 
Proposed Legislation 
 The Trayvon Martin incident caught the attention of  North Carolina’s legislators. The 
incident would lead to the proposal of 2012’s H.B. 1192 and  2013’s  H.B. 976. 2012’s H.B. 
1192 proposed for the deletion of North Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground”  law and wanted to 
supplant it with a new self-defense statute that only pertained to the home.  The bill was 
introduced on May 29, 2012 and no further action was taken on it from May 30, 2012 (H.B. 
1192). H.B 976 proposed numerous things.  The most  important one is the elimination of “Stand 
Your Ground” from North Carolina’s statutes and replacing it with a section that only pertains to 
defense in the home, similar to H.B. 1192. The other provisions were aimed at firearms. For 
example, it also proposed universal background checks  for the private transfer of firearms, 
required firearm owners  who reside with minors to securely lock up their firearms in a storage 
device or make it unable to be fired when the firearms are not in their immediate possession, and 
required them to report a missing firearm within forty-eight hours  after discovering that it is 
missing. The bill was first introduced in April 2013 and has yet to pass the House (H.B. 976). 
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Despite, some legislators attempts at changes, North Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground”  has 
remained since it was adopted . 
 Much like the other jurisdictions in this study, North Carolina has seen its fair share of 
legislation aimed at expanding gun rights. For example, 2013’s H.B. 49 prohibited employers 
from enforcing a rule that does not allow employees to store their firearms or ammunition in 
their vehicles. This is important to consider in conjunction with the fact that North Carolina’s 
“Stand Your  Ground” law applies the presumption of reasonableness to workplaces. Allowing 
employees to have guns in the workplace would strengthen this provision. Another  proposal was 
2013’s  S.B. 146. It  proposed that concealed handgun permit holders be allowed to carry their 
weapons in a place of worship or on school grounds. All of these bills failed to make it past the 
Senate (H.B. 49; S.B. 146). One bill did pass however, H.B. 937. It allows faculty at public 
universities and colleges to keep their weapons locked inside their vehicles in the institution’s 
parking lot. This became a law on July 29
th
, 2013 with the signature of the governor  (H.B. 937). 
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CHAPTER 9: THE CULTURE OF HONOR 
 Laws are not passed in a vacuum. They tend to be subject to political, social, or cultural 
factors at work. The “Culture of Honor” theory offers a cultural factor to explain the popularity 
of the “Stand Your Ground” law among southern states. This theory was first introduced in the 
1990’s by Psychologists Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen in 1996’s Culture of Honor: The 
Psychology of Violence in the South and later re-examined by Sociologist Malcolm Gladwell in 
2009’s Outliers: The Story of Success. The theory seeks to explain why historical the South’s 
culture  has been more accepting of violence as a method of conflict resolution more than the 
North’s culture. For example, in the 1800s, using self-defense as justification or excuse for 
homicide was accepted by the majority of the  South, resulting in acquittals for homicides that 
would  likely have been considered cold-blooded murder in the North (Catafalmo 506). The 
theory points to the South having a “culture of honor” as the reason behind the divergent views 
of the regions.  
 A “culture of honor” is not unique to the South.  There are “cultures of honor” in 
countries all over the world, from a Greek Shepherd to an East African warrior (Cohen and 
Nesbett 7). While “cultures of honor” differ in locations, they share  some common 
characteristics. The first and most important one is  that  people  in these cultures are willing to 
use violence to defend their reputation or “honor.”  This is not the honor that is associated with 
being honest or having integrity. This honor is based on a “man’s strength and power to enforce 
his will on others” (Cohen and Nisbett 4).  Another characteristic of these cultures is “a man’s 
reputation is at the center of his livelihood and self-worth” (Gladwell 16).  The third  
characteristic is that  these cultures are likely to develop when “the individual is at economic risk 
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from his fellows and the state is too weak or nonexistent and thus cannot prevent or punish theft 
of property” (Cohen and Nisbett 4). While all of these characteristics do not fit the South of 
today, they accurately characterize one of the South’s ancestors: the Scotch-Irish. 
 Over in Europe, this group was  considered to be the fringes of Britain society and lived 
in  Ireland, Scotland, and Wales (Cohen and Nisbett 4). The regions where they stayed were 
characterized with constant violence and lawlessness. The geography of the region also played 
an important role. These regions were rocky and  marginally fertile, so farming was out of the 
question. The Scotch-Irish turned to herding animals to make a living (Gladwell 167). Their 
well-being and their families’ well-being depended on herding. The herdsmen had to  protect his 
herd. The loss of any member could mean ruin. Because of this, he had to be aggressive to show 
that he  was  not weak (Gladwell 166). He had to display through his actions and deeds that he 
was  willing to fight in response to any challenge of his reputation (Gladwell 167). Remember 
that in these regions there was no court for a herdsmen to sue in or police for him to call, if 
someone stole one of his animals. A good reputation for being a fighter or a “man of honor” was 
his only protection against such thievery. A man that turned the other cheek was unlikely to 
survive in this environment. Other men would take his passiveness for weakness and it would not 
be too long before his herd was gone. Reputation and honor were the focal points of this society. 
In contrast, farmers did not have to worry about their livelihoods being stolen because crops are 
not easily stolen. A thief could attempt to steal crops but it would be impracticable and time 
consuming to go through the harvesting process to steal someone else’s crops (Gladwell 166). 
This is part of the reason why “cultures of honors” are generally not found in farming 
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populations. The North was founded by farmers, such as the  Puritans, Quakers, Dutch, and 
Germans (Cohen and Nisbet 7). Whereas, the Scotch-Irish drifted to Southern states. 
 Their first major period of migration was 1717- 1718, in which about 500 immigrants 
came over to America  (Jackson 45). By the end of the colonial period, approximately 250,000 of 
them had migrated to America (Jackson 92). Five of  the eight states in this study are some of 
their popular destinations: Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, and  
Mississippi (Gladwell 167).   
They migrated to areas that had similar characteristics as their previous homes: remote, 
lawless, rocky, and marginally fertile (Gladwell 167- 168).  These areas allowed them to 
replicate their ways of life from their old homes in America. For example,  Historians Forrest 
McDonald and Gregory McWhiney  wrote that, the Scotch- Irish had brought to the  New World 
with them the practice of herding hogs. They claim that from 1715 to 1837,”the hog was king” 
(Jackson 90). In fact,  “sometimes the hog numbered as many as 1,000 per mile as they moved 
out of North Carolina. . .  “ (Jackson 90).  Herding was not the only custom that the Scotch-Irish 
brought over from their homes. The ideals of the  Scotch-Irish’s “culture of honor”  also sprung 
up. According to former Senator and author James Webb, in their culture, “Success itself was 
usually defined in personal reputation rather than worldly goods” (180). Because they chose to 
settle in remote frontiers, they had to take the law in their own hands once again.  Men still had 
to defend their honor against any insult to protect their livelihoods. Gladwell offers this mentality 
as an explanation for the trends of the South’s criminality. According to him, the South’s murder 
rate is higher than the rest of the country, “[b]ut property and stranger crimes are lower” (169). 
He goes on to quote Sociologist John Shelton Reed, “The homicides that the South seems to 
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specialize are those in someone is being killed by someone he (or often she) knows, for reasons 
both killer and victim understand” (Gladwell 169). It is about fighting over one’s honor 
(Gladwell 169). 
 Psychologists Cohen and Nisbett were interested to see how this culture of honor had 
impacted the actions and responses of Southerners in the 1990s, the time period at the time of 
their study. They conducted different experiments on forty-two northern and forty-one southern 
male students at the University of Michigan to see how they would respond to different stimuli. 
In the “bump experiment”, the subjects were required to fill out a questionnaire and turn it in at 
the end of a hall. On the way to the turn in the questionnaire, a participant, that the subjects did 
not know was a part of the experiment, would bump into the subjects and call them “assholes.” 
There was a control group whose members turned in their questionnaires without being bumped. 
To examine physiological reactions to the insult, the participants cortisol and testosterone levels 
were measured. The former is a “hormone associated with high levels of stress, anxiety, and 
arousal in humans and in animals” Cohen and Nisbett 45). In accordance with the “Culture of 
Honor” theory, southerners should  have been more upset by the insult show a rise in cortisol 
levels when compared to the control group. Northerners on the other hand, should  have been 
minimally affected by the insult and  should have shown little or no rise in cortisol levels when 
compared to the control group. In regards to testosterone , it is related to aggression and 
dominant behavior.Cohen and Nisbett hypothesized that, “If southerners respond to the insult as 
a challenge and are preparing themselves for future aggression or dominance contests, we would 
expect a testosterone  increase after the bump. If northerners are relatively unaffected, we would 
not expect their testosterone  levels to rise very much” (46).  Cortisol and testosterone  levels 
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were tested before and after the bump. Cortisol levels rose 79% for insulted southerners and 42% 
for control southerners. As for their northern counterparts, “the levels rose 33% for insulted 
northerners and 39% for control northerners” (47).  As predicted, the insulted southerners 
showed the largest increase in cortisol levels. The same would be true for testosterone  levels. 
They increased 12% for insulted southerners and 4% for control southerners. The insulted 
northerners increased 6% and the control northerners increased 4% (Cohen and Nisbett 48).  
 In another experiment,  the subjects unknowingly played a game of chicken after the 
“bump experiment.” The subjects were sent to walk down the hall once again, but this time 
another participant would walk directly toward them. Tables were arranged in the hallway so that 
there was no space for the both the   participant and subject to walk by each other; one would 
have to step aside to avoid a collision. The researchers expected the insulted southerner to have 
an aggressive approach to the challenge and go farther toward the participant before moving to 
avoid a collision (Cohen and Nisbett 49). This prediction proved to be correct. The insulted 
southerners waited until they got about three feet away from the participant before “chickening 
out”. Whereas the control southerners chickened out at about nine feet (Cohen and Nisbett 49) . 
The control and insulted northerners “chickened out” at about the same distance, so the insult did 
not have much of an affect on the northerners’ behavior (Cohen and Nisbett 49). 
In another interesting experiment, the researchers gave the subjects a narrative in which 
their fiancé told them about another man was making passes at her. The other man then tried to 
kiss the fiancé. The researchers asked the subjects to full in the rest of the story. 75% of insulted 
southerners completed the narrative with an ending involving them injuring or threaten to injure 
the other man(Cohen and Nisbett 49) . Only 20% of the control southerners had this response. 
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With the northerners the opposite happened. 55% control northerners gave a response involving 
threat or violence ,while only  41% of insulted northerners responded completed the scenario 
with such an ending (Cohen and Nisbett 49). Once again the insult is shown not to have much of 
an influence on the northerners. Cohen and Nisbett used the findings to draw this conclusion 
about why violence as a response to an insult is more common in the South than the North:  
It is not just that southerners have attitudes that are more approving of violence to an 
insult in the abstract. The insulted southerner feels his reputation threatened , he becomes 
angry, and is cognitively and physiologically prepared for aggression. The insult is a 
matter about which something must be done , and aggressive or domineering behavior 
toward offenders (or even bystanders) is required. (Cohen and Nisbett 52) 
Cohen and Nisbett warn that this conclusion was  an extrapolation based on a small sample. 
However,  Gladwell points out some interesting characteristics about this sample. None of them 
were herdsmen, none of their parents were herdsmen, unlike the Scotch-Irish. The median 
income for northerners was $85,000 and for southerners $95,000. In fact, some of their parents 
were CEOs of companies like Coca-Cola.  They did not face poverty like the Scotch-Irish. Also, 
they were living in the 1990s at the time  and attending a university not living in colonial times 
on the lawless frontier like  the Scotch-Irish. The features that helped to produce a “culture of 
honor”  in the Scotch-Irish were not present in the study’s sample. It seems quite peculiar how 
the southerners’ circumstances were so different from the Scotch-Irish of the past but they 
reacted in  a similar fashion like the Scotch-Irish  would have after the bump and other insults in 
the experiments (Gladwell 174). The reader may wonder how can the  culture of honor be alive 
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and well under such different circumstances. Gladwell answers this question by looking at the 
“Culture of Honor” as a cultural legacy: 
Cultural legacies are powerful forces. They have deep roots and long lives. They persist 
generation after generation virtually intact, even as the economic and social and 
demographic conditions have vanished, and they play such a role in directing attitudes 
and behavior that we cannot make of our world without them. (175) 
In relation to self-defense, the duty to retreat is incompatible with the  South’s culture of honor. 
One who retreated would have a poor reputation and would be perceived as weak by the rest of 
the society. “Stand Your Ground” is a natural fit for the  South’s culture of honor.  For example, 
“[t]he right to stand one’s ground  flows from notions of honor, chivalry, and the right to 
freedom from attack and violation entrenched in Southern society” (Catafalmo 505). It might not 
be a coincidence that five of the eight states in this study had a significant Scotch- Irish 
population at one point and/or the Scotch-Irish had a role in settling them.  Their transmission of 
the culture of honor could have turned these states into fertile grounds for the “Stand Your 
Ground” law to flourish. 
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CHAPTER 10: AN ARGUMENT FOR REVISIONS TO LAW TODAY 
 In comparison to other jurisdictions, no state has exceeded the broadness of Florida’s 
“Stand Your Ground” law, in terms of the protections and subject areas that it covers. While 
states have used Florida as a guide, they have been careful to not make their statutes as strong as 
Florida’s, for example, not all of the jurisdictions offer both civil and criminal immunity. Almost 
half of the jurisdictions in this study offer only civil immunity. In essence, Florida created the 
“incredible hulk” of “Stand Your Ground” laws. It is possible that the issues that Florida has 
been plagued with in relation to “Stand Your Ground” is because of the law’s strength, while the 
other jurisdictions have remained relatively unscathed.   The earlier mentioned criticisms that 
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law has faced, such as ambiguity in the term “unlawful activity”, 
the presumption of reasonableness, the application of civil and criminal immunity, and law 
enforcement’s application of the law, have yet to be addressed by the Florida legislature. Critics 
of “Stand Your Ground” have advocated the elimination of the statute altogether. This  is not a 
feasible solution. In all of the jurisdictions in this study, this course of action has been met by 
defeat. Instead of going for the jugular and getting rid of “Stand Your Ground,”  Florida 
legislatures should look at what  legislatures have done in other jurisdictions have done to adjust 
“Stand Your Ground” to accommodate their needs and take them under consideration when 
evaluating Florida’s law.  
 One example is how different jurisdictions have chosen to handle the granting of 
immunity. Florida’s statute is broad when compared to other jurisdictions because it covers both  
civil and criminal immunity. The legislature has quite a few options when it comes to this. It can 
take the Georgia approach by only allowing criminal immunity. There is also the Mississippi 
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approach where the defendant receives civil immunity after being found not guilty in a criminal 
trial. The issue with these two approaches is that the Florida legislature has been very adamant 
about the statute granting both kinds of immunity and avoiding citizens having to go through a 
trial. A more likely candidate is the Tennessee approach. Tennessee only grants civil immunity. 
However, it has some restrictions in regards to civil immunity. The defender is not granted civil 
immunity if he hurts an innocent bystander or damages someone’s property who was  not 
involved in the attack. This approach would not only protect a victim from the attacker or the 
attacker’s family suing but would also allow reparations for citizens caught in the crossfire. Why 
should a citizen be penalized for being in the wrong place at the wrong time? This approach was 
suggested to the Florida legislature after Jenkins incident, in which a young Miami girl was 
murdered in the crossfire of rival gang member, and voted down. The researcher believes that it 
should be reconsidered. A possible revision to it is that only the attacker or initial aggressor can 
be held responsible for injuries to bystanders and property damages, while the person using 
lawful self-defense would be granted civil and criminal immunity. Another area where Florida 
can look to other jurisdictions is the provision regarding officers using “standard procedures” to 
investigate these cases and not making an arrest unless there is probable cause. Because of the 
complexity of these cases, probable case is difficult to obtain and as mentioned before the 
vagueness of the phrase “unlawful activity” has caused officers across Florida to proceed with 
these cases in different and contradicting manners. The Florida legislature could take the 
approach that the majority of the states in this study , like North Carolina, have taken and not 
have  this provision. Another approach is the Louisiana approach  in which officers are 
authorized to conduct a full investigation if a death occurs under suspicious circumstances. The 
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Florida legislature has been hesitant to make any revisions to “Stand Your Ground” since its 
inception and these approaches seem to extreme. The researcher’s recommended approach is 
Florida legislatures working with officers to delineate what the standard procedures for these 
cases should be. Because of the complexity of these cases, there should be a special type of 
protocol for them. A third area in which the Florida legislature should consider looking at what 
other jurisdictions has done is the use of “unlawful activity.”  Except for North Carolina, all the 
states in this study have adopted this term. An issue with this term is  that unlawful activity could 
apply to any crime. For example, someone could be smoking marijuana outside and is attacked 
by a stranger. Should his smoking of marijuana, a misdemeanor, preclude from receiving the 
protections of “Stand Your Ground?” North Carolina helps to clear up this gray area by only 
preventing those who are engaged in a felony from “Stand Your Ground’s” protections. The 
Florida legislature should take this approach under consideration. 
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CHAPTHER 11: SUMMARY 
Comparing the Other States to Florida 
Table 5: Comparing Other States to Florida 
 “Duty to 
Retreat” 
or “No 
Duty to 
Retreat”  
before 
2005  
Grants 
Civil  and 
Criminal 
Immunity 
Authorizes 
Officers to 
use 
“standard 
procedures”  
Same 
Locations for 
the 
Presumption 
of 
reasonableness 
as FL  
Presumption  
of 
trespasser’s 
criminal 
intent  
Same 
Requirements 
as FL  for 
presumption  
of 
reasonableness 
to apply  
Same 
Exclusions as 
FL for 
presumption 
of 
reasonableness   
Alabama  Duty to 
Retreat, 
via case 
law and 
statutory 
law  
Yes  Yes  Yes, but adds  
nuclear 
powerplants  
No  Yes, but adds 
3 more  
Yes  
Georgia  No Duty 
to 
Retreat  
via case 
law  
Only 
civil 
immunity  
No  No  No  No  No  
N. 
Carolina 
 
  
Took a 
different 
approach. 
Duty to 
retreat 
applied 
when 
attack 
was not 
made 
with 
felonious 
intent  
Yes   Yes, but adds 
workplace  
Yes  Yes  Yes, but adds 
bailbondsmen 
and a fleeing 
person  
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 “Duty to 
Retreat” or 
“No Duty 
to Retreat”  
before 
2005  
Grants 
Civil  and 
Criminal 
Immunity 
Authorizes 
Officers to 
use “standard 
procedures”  
Same 
Locations for 
the 
Presumption 
of 
reasonableness 
as FL  
Presumption  
of 
trespasser’s 
criminal 
intent  
Same 
Requirements 
as FL  for 
presumption  
of 
reasonableness 
to apply  
Same 
Exclusions as 
FL for 
presumption 
of 
reasonableness   
S. Carolina  Duty to 
Retreat via 
case law  
Yes, but 
SC 
narrows its 
application 
to only the 
use of 
deadly 
force  
Yes  Yes  Yes,and 
adds 
requirement 
concerning 
lawful 
resident 
violating 
restraining 
order and 
other legal  
restrictions 
Yes  No, missing 
FL’s 
requirement 
about force 
being used 
against lawful 
resident with a 
restraining 
order against 
him/ her  
Mississippi No Duty to 
Retreat via 
case law 
Yes, but 
most be 
found not 
guilty  first  
to receive 
civil 
immunity 
No Yes, but added 
businesses and 
place of 
employments 
No Yes No, missing 
three 
exclusions 
Tennessee Changed 
from Duty 
to Retreat 
to No Duty 
To Retreat 
via 
statutory 
law in 
1989 
Only civil 
immunity 
but does 
not apply 
to 
innocent 
bystanders 
and 
property 
damages 
No Yes, but had 
this prior to 
Florida; 
however, 
Tenn. did 
adopt 
Florida’s list 
and added 
businesses to 
it 
No No, missing 
requirement 
about 
removing 
from vehicle, 
residence, or 
dwelling 
Yes 
Louisiana  Middle 
Ground 
Approach. 
Citizens 
had to 
retreat if 
reasonable. 
Only civil 
immunity 
No, 
authorizes 
officers to 
conduct a full 
investigation 
if death 
occurs from 
violence or 
suspicious 
circumstances 
Yes, but added 
businesses to 
it 
No No, missing 
the 
requirement of 
attacker 
removing to 
attempting to 
remove 
someone  
No, missing 
exclusions 
concerning 
force used 
against 
officers and 
attacking 
someone who 
has right to be 
there 
 
The above chart lists the non-Florida jurisdictions in this study and see how they compare 
with Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” elements. The first column lists where the jurisdictions 
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stood on the issue of duty to retreat versus no duty to retreat prior to Florida’s passage of “Stand 
Your Ground.” Two of these jurisdictions, Alabama and South Carolina, imposed  the  duty to 
retreat.  Two other jurisdictions took different approaches, Louisiana and North Carolina. 
Because of the uniqueness of their approaches, the researcher did not feel that it was adequate to 
put them in either the duty to retreat or no duty to retreat category. For example, in North 
Carolina, the duty to retreat depended on if the attack was made with felonious intent. This is not 
seen in any other jurisdiction in this study.   Three states, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia 
were  no duty to retreat  jurisdictions prior to Florida’s passage of “Stand Your Ground.”  
Mississippi and Georgia had been this way for over a century via case law. After Florida’s 
passage “Stand Your Ground,” their legislatures felt the need to codify this. Tennessee is an 
anomaly in that it statutorily abolished the duty to retreat in 1989.   
 Florida’s “Stand Your Ground”  served as the boilerplate for most of these jurisdictions 
to construct their statutes. The above chart illustrates how many of the jurisdictions have the 
same elements found in Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” ,added some of their own provisions, 
and/or did not include certain elements. Commonalties among the jurisdictions are eliminating 
the duty to retreat for someone who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where he 
has the legal right to be, the granting of  immunity, applying the presumption of reasonable to 
certain locations, and the requirements and exclusions for the presumption of reasonableness. 
There are some variations among these commonalties. For example,  the elimination of the duty 
to retreat for someone who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where he has the 
legal right to be is uniform in each the states except for North Carolina, which restricts it to 
someone not engaged in a felony. Another area is the granting of immunity. While the states all 
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grant civil immunity, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Georgia do not also grant criminal 
immunity. In the application of the presumption of reasonableness in certain locations, in 
addition to the locations that Florida has, four states, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, and 
North Carolina, have included businesses and/or places of employment. South Carolina has the 
exact same locations as Florida. Alabama includes the unique federally licensed nuclear plants in 
its list. As for the requirements for the presumption of reasonableness, only Alabama, North 
Carolina, and Mississippi have  adopted all of Florida’s requirements, with Alabama adding 
three of its own.  In contrast, Tennessee and Louisiana only took a few of Florida’s requirements.  
Whereas, Florida has all of their requirements, they do not have all of Florida’s.  In regards to the 
exclusions, Alabama, North Carolina, and Tennessee have adopted all of Florida’s exclusions, 
with North Carolina adding one of its own. Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina are 
missing some of Florida’s exclusions. Florida has all of their exclusions but they do not have all 
of Florida’s. 
 The areas where the most divergence can be seen is in regards to recommending that 
officers use standard procedures to investigate “Stand Your Ground” cases and the presumption 
of a trespasser’s intent. Only South Carolina and Alabama have this recommendation to officers. 
While the majority of the jurisdictions are mute on this point, Louisiana has gone against this 
recommendation by requiring officers to conduct a full investigation if a death occurs under 
suspicious circumstances or as a result of violence.   In regards to the presumption regarding a 
trespasser’s intent, only North Carolina and South Carolina have adopted a presumption 
regarding a trespasser’s intent. In addition, South Carolina adds another presumption concerning 
Florida’s presumption of trespasser’s criminal intent. It presumes that anyone who enters or tries 
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to enter a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle who is  “in violation of an order of protection, 
restraining order, or condition of bond is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an 
unlawful act. . .” (§ 16-11-450 (E)). 
 Florida has exerted influence on each of these jurisdictions. This influence has not been 
equal. In Tennessee and Georgia, Florida’s influence was not as strong as the other jurisdictions. 
With Georgia, it simply added two provisions from Florida’s ”Stand Your Ground” into its 
already existing statute, the provisions concerning the elimination of the duty to retreat and the 
granting of civil immunity. It was not a complete or near  rewrite like most of the  other 
jurisdictions. The reader should take note of all the no’s that Georgia has in the table. In regards 
to Tennessee, it was quite progressive when it came to self-defense . While self-defense in the 
other jurisdictions was largely decided by case law, Tennessee had codified its statute removing 
the duty to retreat sixteen years before Florida passed “Stand Your Ground.”  Also Tennessee, 
statutorily adopted the presumption of reasonableness over a decade before Florida did; although 
it was only limited to the home. Tennessee would still take portions of Florida’s statute and 
merge it with its own. Regardless of these anomalies, the jurisdictions in this study have mostly 
adopted provisions that are similar to Florida’s and some of the critiques aimed at Florida can be 
aimed at them as well. 
Future of the Law 
 For the time being “Stand Your Ground” is here to stay. In the majority of the 
jurisdictions discussed, the law was passed with overwhelming support by the legislatures. 
Florida, the state where most of the conflicts regarding the law has happened, has chosen to stand 
by the law and has not made any amendments since its passage, even after the Martin incident. 
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Legislators in other  states have deemed incidents, like the one involving Martin incident, as 
anomalies and have not seen the need to change their law based on a peculiar case. In looking at 
proposals post- “Stand Your Ground”, only one state has  had a successful proposal that 
weakened the law or went in an opposite direction than Florida.: Louisiana. Louisiana amended 
its  law in 2012 by adding the provision that officers must  conduct a full investigation if a death 
occurs under suspicious circumstances or as a result of violence  in reaction to the Martin 
incident.  Other proposals to either amend or abolish the law have failed. Legislation has been 
more aimed at strengthening “Stand Your Ground” and other gun laws.  The same pieces of 
legislation can be seen in different jurisdictions. For example, proposals authorizing the carrying 
of handguns in public parks, post-secondary educational institutions, churches, and prohibiting 
employers from making rules forbidding an employee from storing a handgun in his vehicle on 
the company’s property in multiple jurisdictions. Although these proposals have not been 
successful in all of the jurisdictions in which they proposed,  there have been more of them 
proposed and they have had a better success rate than those proposals aimed at weakening or 
abolishing the law. This is a  strong indicator of the direction that legislators want to take “Stand 
Your Ground” and gun laws in general.  
Comparing Justifiable Homicides 
 The researcher was only able to obtain justifiable homicide statistics for Florida, Georgia, 
Tennessee, and South Carolina. For Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee, the researcher was able to 
obtain the statistics only concerning justifiable homicides committed by private citizens. With 
South Carolina, justifiable homicides committed by private citizens is lumped together with 
those committed by police officers. All of these jurisdictions have a similar definition of 
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justifiable homicides: “the killing of the perpetrator of a serious criminal offense either by a law 
enforcement officer in the line of duty or by a private citizen, during the commission of a serious 
criminal offense”  (FDLE). In all of these jurisdictions, there is an increase in the average 
number of justifiable homicides per year from the years immediately preceding the passage of 
“Stand Your Ground” and the years after. In Florida, the number  more than tripled  from  twelve 
per year to forty  killings per year. In Georgia, it more than doubled from six a year to about 
thirteen killings a year. In Tennessee, the average increased from 17.5 per year to 21.5 justifiable 
homicides per year. In South Carolina, the average increased from 10.8  per year to 12.8 killings.  
It  should be noted that because South Carolina’s data include both justifiable homicides 
committed by private citizens and officers, it cannot be determined how much of a role 
justifiable homicides committed by private citizens played in the increase. However, it is 
interesting to note that all these jurisdictions the passage of “Stand Your Ground” is marked by 
an increase in the number of justifiable homicides. This is not to say that that is “Stand Your 
Ground” caused the number of justifiable homicides to increase, but there is a correlation 
between the two.  Florida’s increase has probably received the most attention in law review and 
newspaper articles among the jurisdictions because it is the most dramatic increase.  
The Influence of the South’s Culture of Honor 
 The “Culture of Honor” Theory offers a cultural factor that contributed to the spread of 
“Stand Your Ground” laws in the South like a wildfire. According to this theory, the South 
received its culture of honor from the Scotch-Irish, a group that played a role in settling 
numerous Southern states. Five of which are included in this study: Tennessee, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Alabama, and  Mississippi. The Scotch-Irish developed a “culture of honor” due 
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to social and environmental factors in the regions in which they inhabited. Because the land was 
rocky and marginally fertile, they turned to herding animals. Their herds were their and their 
families’ livelihood. In a culture of honor, members have to use violence to respond to insults or 
intrusions in order to preserve their reputation of honor. This reputation is a very important in 
these societies. In the Scotch-Irish society,  herdsmen had to have a reputation of honor to 
survive. If a herdsmen was perceived as weak, other herdsmen would steal from his herd and 
leave him without  a herd and no way to support his family. A herdsmen had to fight intruders to 
show that he was not weak. Because the areas they lived in were remote and lawless, herdsmen 
had to take the law into their own hands and protect their herds. Retreating from an attack would 
be seen as weak and was not compatible with the values of this society. Anyone who wanted a 
reputation of honor would stand his ground and fight when attacked. 
 This group would start migrating to America in the 1700s and settled in Southern states. 
It brought herding and its “culture of honor” with it. This is in contrast to the North which was 
settled by farmers. Farmers do not have to develop a reputation of honor because it is unlikely 
that their neighbors would steal their whole field of crops. This could explain why the North was 
been in favor of the duty to retreat.  In the 1990s, Psychologists Nisbett and Cohen, would 
conduct a series of experiment on forty-two northern and forty-one southern male students at the 
University of Michigan to see how they would respond to different stimuli. In each experiment 
the insulted southerners had the most violence and aggressive responses to an insult. This led 
Nisbett and Cohen to draw this important conclusion:  
It is not just that southerners have attitudes that are more approving of violence to an 
insult in the abstract. The insulted southerner feels his reputation threatened , he becomes 
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angry, and is cognitively and physiologically prepared for aggression. The insult is a 
matter about which something must be done , and aggressive or domineering behavior 
toward offenders (or even bystanders) is required. (Cohen and Nisbett 52) 
It is interesting that the students were completely different from  the Scotch-Irish. For example, 
they were not herdsmen, did not live in a lawless territory, and came from well-off families. 
However, the Southerners still reacted like a Scotch-Irishmen would have centuries ago to an 
insult. It is unlikely that a person that would react in such a way to an insult would agree with the 
duty to retreat. “Stand Your Ground” seems like a more natural fit for a society where people 
behave like that. While this theory does offer a plausible explanation to the popularity of “Stand 
Your Ground” in the South, it does have some holes. For example,  the Scotch-Irish played a role 
in a settling or were once  significant portion of the populations of  Tennessee, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Alabama, and  Mississippi. However, Alabama, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
obeyed the duty to retreat for the majority of their histories. This does not make sense if the 
South’s culture of honor is as strong as the researchers suggest. While this theory explains why 
some jurisdictions did not operate under the duty to retreat since their beginnings, like Georgia 
and Mississippi, it leaves one to wonder why other jurisdictions waited more than a century later 
to adopt “Stand Your Ground.” The researcher suggests that the NRA played more of a role in 
the passage of “Stand Your Ground” in recent years than the  “culture of honor.”  The NRA 
lobbied heavy in the jurisdictions in this study and used its influence to get it passed. Notice how 
the NRA chose Florida as its first target. Florida was not settled by the Scotch-Irish and is mainly 
considered southern because of its location, not because of the cultural characteristics it shares 
with other Southern states. These factors plus Florida being a strictly duty to retreat  state for all 
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of its history  prior to 2005  indicate that Florida was immune to the  South’s culture of honor. 
However, the NRA chose it anyway because reputation as a leader in gun policy in the past. A 
sure indication of the NRA’s influence is Florida’s former Governor Jeb Bush signing “Stand 
Your Ground” into law with the ex-president of the NRA by his side.  This is not to say that the 
South’s culture of honor did not play a role. The South’s culture of honor may have played a role 
in jurisdictions like Mississippi, Georgia, and Tennessee, already being no duty to retreat via 
case law or statutory law and making it easy for them to adopt a version of Florida’s “Stand Your 
Ground”  law ,because it was in line with their legal principles already. However, in the other 
jurisdictions in this study who were not definitely no duty to retreat  before Florida’s passage, 
Louisiana, Alabama, South Carolina, and North Carolina,  Florida’s passage and the NRA’s 
lobbying had a stronger influence than the South’s culture of honor in converting them. Once 
Florida passed its law, legislators in the majority of the other jurisdictions would begin to 
considering adopting their own version of the law and would use Florida as a reason to convince 
other legislators and their constituents to support the law. Florida’s passage gave the law validity 
in the eyes of other jurisdictions. Florida’s passage would give the NRA motivation to push the 
law in other jurisdictions. The NRA would lobby in other jurisdictions with Florida as its mascot. 
The combination of the NRA’s lobbying and Florida’s passage would sway the majority of the 
jurisdictions in this study. 
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CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has added to literature by exploring other “Stand Your Ground” jurisdictions 
that have been neglected thus far. It accomplished this by examining how Florida, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi handled the issue of 
self-defense prior to Florida’s 2005 passage. It then looked at what made these jurisdictions  
decide to adopt “Stand Your Ground” and compared their statutes to Florida’s to see how 
uniform they were to Florida’s and to judge how influential Florida was to them. The thesis them 
examined what proposals have been made regarding “Stand Your Ground” and if any 
amendments have been made since its adoption in the jurisdictions. For  four of these 
jurisdictions, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee, the researcher was able to obtain 
figures for the number of justifiable homicides per year in years preceding and following the 
passage of “Stand Your Ground.” In the latter part of the thesis, it examines the South’s culture 
of honor as possible examination for the appeal of “Stand Your Ground” in the South. 
 The thesis uncovered that Florida has the broadest “Stand Your Ground” statute in terms 
of the issues that it covers and in the protections it offers. For the most part, the other 
jurisdictions have stayed in line with the formula that Florida first established. Georgia and 
Tennessee are outliers in that Georgia only added two amendments from the Florida’s statute 
into its already existing law and Tennessee already had some of the provisions in Florida’s 
“Stand Your Ground”  before Florida did and just merged them with some of Florida’s newer 
elements. In the four of the jurisdictions that the researcher was able to obtain data on justifiable 
homicides,  Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee showed an increase in the average number of 
justifiable homicides committed by private citizens between the years preceding the passage of  
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“Stand Your Ground” and the years after. South Carolina had justifiable homicides committed by 
private citizens included with those committed by police officers and there was no way to 
separate them but an increase was seen in this overall number citizens between the years 
preceding the passage of  “Stand Your Ground” and the years after. In looking at the future of 
“Stand Your Ground”, only Louisiana has been able to make an amendment to its statute. The 
bulk of legislation has been aimed at strengthening “Stand Your Ground” and other gun laws, 
with similar legislation showing up in numerous jurisdictions. Because Florida’s law has been 
the main focus, the researcher suggested that Florida look at what other states have done in their 
statute as guides for possible revisions. In regards to the South’s culture of honor contributing to 
the spread of “Stand Your Ground”, it does explain why some states, such as Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Georgia, that were already no duty to retreat by case or statutory law easily 
adopted Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law. However, for  states that were not no duty to retreat 
before  Florida passed “Stand Your Ground”, Florida and  the NRA’s influence played more of a 
role in their adopting their own version of the law. 
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